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PREFACE 
Cooperation and competition, in some form, pervade most 
aspects of mankind's life. This study was done in an attempt 
to measure behaviorally and verbally, human reaction to 
others in a potentially competitive situation. Since the 
present study is concerned with the mundane realism of the 
experimental situation, a point that seems to have been 
overlooked in most studies relating competition to status, 
there was very little guidance outside that provided by my 
adviser, Dr. Bob Helm. Since the present study was an 
early attempt in obtaining high degrees of realism, several 
aspects of it are purely investigatory. In particular, 
studies which compare message usage with behavioral corre-
lates of competition and cooperation are in the pioneering 
stages of inquiry. In this aspect the present study rep-
resents pilot work. 
Perhaps one of the more difficult aspects of this 
study was obtaining the participation of high status members. 
My special thanks to members of the Third ROTC region with-
out whose help this study would have been impossible. 
The remaining members of my committee, Dr. William 
Scott and Dr. Joseph Stout, deserve particular appreciation 
for their encouragement and help given me in the planning 
and preparation of this study. Other members of the 
iii 
Psychology department were quite helpful whenever special 
advice was needed. 
In addition, I would like to extend my appreciation to 
Dr. Robert Morrison, who provided immeasurable help through 
the statistical analysis portion of this study and without 
whose help the special programming of the SAS system, re-
quired by this study, would have been impossible. Particu-
larly one of his graduate students, Ben Mullinex, who gave 
so freely of his time. 
Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Margaret, for 
her patience, encouragement and understanding, without 
which graduate study would have been a burden rather than 
a pleasure. 
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CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to study the effects of 
status differentials on cooperation, competition, and 
message usage between dyads of dissimilar statuses. Fisek, 
Hamit and Ofshe (1970) found that the attributes of the 
participants themselves are the variables that determine 
status structures. Therefore, the interaction processes 
themselves would be patterned after correlates of the status 
hierarchy. Berger, Fisek, and Hamit (1970); they postulated 
that participants in an interaction operate with the infor-
mation available about the states of specific status char-
acteristics that each of them possess. This is enacted in 
the form of task expectations for self and others. Further-
more, the patterns of status influence can be expected to be 
delineated in communications between members of dissimilar 
statuses. Moore, Johnson, and Arnold (1972) have experi-
mentally identified communication patterns in restricted 
communication networks that emphasize relative status ranks 
by interaction participants. 
Cooperation and competition have been studied quite ex-
tensively using a wide variety of tasks (Bass and Dunteman, 
1 
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1963; Blake and Mouton, 1962; Crombag, 1966; Grossak, 1954; 
Julian, Bishop and Fiedler, 1966; Baranowski and Summers, 
1972). A general finding of this literature is that ingroup 
cooperation and outgroup competition produce within group 
solidarity, as measured by semantic differential scales and 
adjective check lists. Although it has never been shown, it 
seems that mundane status of the individual may be an impor-
tant factor influencing cooperation, competition, and inter-
nal communication. 
Status 
English and English (1958) describe status as " ••• the 
position accorded formally or informally, to a person in his 
own group; the acceptance and honor accorded to a person" 
(pg. 173). Kretch, Crutchfield and Ballarchey (1962) define 
status as "the rank of a position or an individual in the 
prestige heirarchy of a group or community" (pg. 82). For 
Homans (1961), status refers to the stimuli a man presents 
to himself and to others. This would include the kinds of 
activity he emits, as well as the kinds of clothes he wears, 
or the residence in which he lives. Two additional state-
ments should be made to describe fully Roman's concept of 
status: (1) to qualify as the sort of stimuli that de-
scribes a man's status, they must be recognized by other 
men, and (2) people must be capable of ranking the stimuli 
with regard to the stimuli provided by other persons. 
Status, therefore, refers to what men perceive about one 
of their peers and placing stimuli in rank order. 
Still another interpretation of status has been postu-
lated by Sherif and Sherif (1956). As they phrase it: 
... when interaction continues over a period of 
time among individuals with persistent, common 
motives or problems, the reciprocal expec-
tations among them fall into hierarchial pat-
terns or scales. A differentiated position in 
this hierarchy is called status (pg. 162). 
Another manner of looking at status is to define it 
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operationally. Harvey (1953) used two sets of operations in 
defining status, sociometric choices and ratings by an inde-
pendent observer. He felt that the sociometric choice tech-
nique analyzed effective initiative. While the ratings by 
an independent observer refer in general to observational 
analysis of the group being made by persons who, themselves, 
are not members of the group. 
Status of members within the groups can be defined 
conceptually or operationally. However, when a broad con-
ceptual definition is used, considerable lattitude in 
behavioral response is implied; that is, the term 'status' 
itself can assume many behavioral definitions. Conversely, 
when status is operationally defined as in the present 
study, a much greater degree of precision is effected. That 
is, the ambiguity of behavioral classification is removed 
for all experimenters and thereby insures the possibility of 
replication at a later date. In this study, as opposed to 
the great majority of studies in this area, real status-
relevant positions were employed, ensuring that mundane 
realism exceeds work done in this area in the past. 
4 
Status and Behavior 
Research in the area of the effect of status on coop-
eration and competition has been inconclusive. Grant and 
Sermat (1969) found that there were indications that game 
behavior was influenced by status or perceived power of the 
players. Although they did not find support for the effects 
of power relationships in their study, they felt that there 
was evidence of such an effect. Faley and Tedeschi (1971) 
found support in their work when they observed that low 
status subjects complied to threats from a higher status 
subject, and that higher status subjects complied more fre-
quently to the threat of an equal status source, than low 
status subjects. In Faley and Tedeschi's work, subjects 
interacted with "bogus" peers, superiors, or lower status 
others. The question of the empirical effects of mundane 
realism remains unanswered in these studies. 
Kahn and Alexander (1971) found that perceived bogus 
differences in social status affect attraction, communi-
cation, and attitude change in the dyad in much the same 
way as actual status differences affect these variables in 
larger groups. Because of this finding, it was considered 
reasonable to use the economy and relative percision of the 
live dyad in this experiment. It was expected that higher 
status persons would have greater influence in the dyad, 
as observed by Faley and Tedeschi (1971). 
Mehrabian (1970) found that higher status persons elic-
ited more affiliation and conformity than those persons of 
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a lower status. On the other hand, Kogan, Nathan, Lamm, 
and Trommsdorff (1972) found that during interaction between 
high and low status members, high status members were more 
flexible. They posit that this was due to a "loss of face" 
of the high status members in making concessions to lower 
status members. Teder and Marcia (1973) confirm this view-
point, at least for females, and recommend that a similar 
study be undertaken utilizing male subjects. 
Gartner and Iverson (1967) found that occupational 
promotional opportunity failed to encourage a positive group 
sentiment. An effort toward status enhancement fostered in-
dividual goals incompatible to a collective identity. Zeff 
and Iverson (1966) found that individuals with potential up-
ward mobility tended to focus in group tasks; however, they 
made relatively little use of their peer group as a basis 
for identifying themselves in terms of status. Because of 
(this dichotomy), it appears as though status assumptions 
are of two kinds. Indeed Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch (1972) 
identify two kinds of assumptions: those dealing with 
specific abilities relevant to the interaction situation, 
and those dealing with generally useful capacities. Graves 
(1972) was able to correlate mutual esteem with the amount 
of interaction initiated, and this may give us an insight 
into the functional reality of status. It may be, as 
Montgomery (1971) has concluded, that high status members 
were merely complying to previously internalized judgmental 
scales while eliciting compliant behavior from status dif-
ferent members, while low status subjects reacted to the 
external situation. Under these circumstances, for the 
investigator studying conformity, the dependent variable 
would be the frequency with which an individual utilizes 
a particular message type. This would represent his inter-
nalized perceptual field. 
In keeping with this degree of internal consistency, 
Gergen and Taylor (1969) found that high status members, 
particularly under conditions of occupational productivity, 
avoid expectations of the group. This seems in consonance 
with Brehm's (1969) theory of psychological reactance which 
assumes universal antipathy ~o others who delimit one's 
freedom of action. The possibility exists, however, as 
Moore (1969) points out, that high status members simply 
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had very little to lose by agreeing with their low status 
partners and, therefore, acted in a cooperative appearing 
manner. Of course the individual consideration is sig-
nificant in any interaction; as Moore and Krupat (1971) 
point out, it is important to consider the subject, who him-
self is an active source, and not simply a passive receiver 
of information. Pisek, Hamit, and Ofshe (1970) consider the 
attributes of group participants the variables that deter-
mine a group's status structure. Teder and Marcia (1973) 
found that a "loss of face'' phenomenon occurred in their 
work with females, and suggested similar work using males. 
The present study utilized males in response to this point. 
Additionally, in conjunction with both Mehrabian (1970) and 
Kogam, Nathan, Lamm, and Tromsdorff (1972) , this study 
looked at the responses elicited from low status members by 
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high status members observed in the former study, and the 
flexibility of high status members found in the latter 
study. In the works of Faley and Tedeschi (1971), Kahan and 
Alexander (1971), and Cohen and Zelditch (1972), bogus or 
imaginary high status members were utilized, therefore, it 
seemed salient that the present study be conducted with 
status differentials high in mundane realism. 
Review of the Literature on Status and Behavior 
The literature on status is vast and varied. Therefore, 
this review will be restricted to status influences on be-
havior. Gergen (1969), using NROTC Cadets, did not find 
confirmation of Brehm's (1966) theory of psychological 
reactance. In fact, Gergen found that high status members, 
under conditions of productivity, avoided expectations of 
the group. This is in direct opposition to Wahram's (1970) 
findings that deviance on the part of high status members 
provoked extreme reaction: Wahram is not alone in these 
findings; others agree with his position (Blau, 1966; 
Hollander and Willis, 1967; and Sabath, 1964). 
Interaction between high and low status members seems 
to carry overtones of implicit behavior. Moore (1968) found 
that information regarding the existence of a status differ-
ential was as potent a factor in leading to differential in-
fluence as was information regarding relevant ability 
differences. Smith (1968) found that competence was a 
salient element of status, at least in children. Zaenglein 
(1971) also found that statuses carried power and control 
potential, with direct effects on influence perception. 
Status appears to exert subtle behavioral influences that 
affect self and other perception in two primary areas: 
(1) perceptual fields of the interactees and (2) mutual ex-
pectations of the interaction outcome. 
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In view of the fact that status appears to affect per-
ceptual processes, a productive area of investigation would 
be that of communication patterns between dissimilar status. 
Grant and Sermatt (1969) recommend the use of limited feed-
back in cases where the experimenter wishes to examine the 
response patterns of status influences. Moore, James, 
Johnson and Arnold (1972) further point out that, in restrict-
ed communication networks, the crucial concern should be 
with the interaction between the structure and the relative 
status ranks of the participants. Baranowski, Summers, and 
David (1972) further feel that a strong correlation exists 
between perception and Prisoner's Dilemma Game behavior, 
particularly that subject perception varies according to 
the status and strategy of the others. Conversely, Fisek, 
Hamit, and Ofshe (1970) found that the attributes of the 
participants themselves were the variables that determine a 
group's status structure. Clearly, there is ambiguity in 
the literature as to precisely what influences status 
presents within dissimilar status interactions. Silver (1970) 
suggests that the term "status" is a highly complex con-
struct and that posited effects may be specific to the 
particular manipulation within the experiment. An example 
of this kind of artifact is outlined by Lott and Sommer 
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(1967) when they describe the effects of allowing eye 
contact within an experiment dealing with status. Further-
more, Cohen, Davis, and James (1973) found that there were 
audience effects on lower status persons that served to 
increase drive. In all these studies the status differential 
is based upon implied meaning, such as sociograms or role 
playing. The obvious lack of mundane realism is evident. 
Therefore, to remove any ambiguity, any further study in 
these areas should resolve the problem of realism, as it 
appears to have an influential effect on behavior; or as a 
minimum, the investigator should insure that the manipulation 
of status is truly viable. Previous studies concerning 
status have not approached the problem of realism with 
authority, and quite often skirt it entirely, particularly 
when the experimenter discovers that high status persons 
are extremely difficult to bring into the laboratory. 
Review of Literature on Cooperation and Competition 
The literature on competition and cooperation is quite 
extensive and varied. In summarizing, this review is gen-
erally limited to the mixed-motive interaction afforded by 
variations of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, used frequently 
in the study of cooperation and competition. This type of 
game was selected for the present study because: (1) much 
background work has already been performed using the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game; (2) it involves motive choices on 
behalf of the subjects; (3) game theory can be utilized as 
a model for human behavior; (4) cooperative and competitive 
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motives can be clearly separated in a quantitative manner; 
and (5) controlled communication between subjects can be 
accurately measured. 
The mixed-motive type of game is one in which the goals 
of the interacting players are partially in cooperation, 
and partially in conflict. The interest in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game lies in the fact that if a player attempts to 
maximize his own goals, with complete disregard to his 
partner, mutual loss will result. However, Gallo and 
Mcclintock (1965), as well as Rapoport and Orwant (1962), 
• 
found in comprehensive reviews that the game is played 
competitively. 
The general form of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game is 
depicted below in Figure 1 (Scodel, Minas, Ratoosh and 
Lipetz, 1959). The following set of general rules apply 
with regard to value relationships across the various 
choice outcomes: (1) 
x 3 x 2 ; and (4) x 4 x 2 . These rules allow for the mixed 
motivation present in the game because they provide reward 
for mutually cooperative behavior, but also provide a 
temptation to exploit the other's cooperative behavior 




Figure 1. General Form of the 
· Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
A common Prisoner's Dilemma Game is represented in 
Figure 2. In the game interaction, Person 1 chooses be-
tween rows A1 and A2 , while Person 2 chooses between column 
B1 and B2 . Person l's payoffs conventionally determined 
by the first number within each cell, and Person 2's pay-
offs are determined by the second number in each group. 
The gains or losses of each person are a function of the 
choices of each. For example, in Figure 2, if Person 1 
chooses row A2 and Person 2 chooses column B2 , Person 1 
would have lost four points, and Person 2 would have lost 
four points. Had Person 1 chosen row A1 and Person 2 
chosen column B2 , Person 1 would have lost five points and 
Person 2 would have gained five points. Cell A1B1 is the 
result of a cooperative strategy on the parts of both 
players, and cell A2B2 the result of competitive choices of 
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both players. The remaining cells reflect a cooperative 




+5 ,-5 -4,-4 
Figure 2. Point Values in the Common 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
Deutsch (1958, 1960) has attempted to explain the para-
doxical behavior of mutually cooperative choices being most 
beneficial, while competitive responses prevail as a function 
of trust. He reasoned there exists no motivation for either 
player to make a cooperative response unless mutual trust 
exists. That is to say, if one cannot trust, it is then 
safer to choose minimum, rather than maximum losses; hence 
a dilemma of whether or not to trust the other person 
emerges. Deutsch further hypothesized that the most im-
portant features of a situation in which an individual can 
either cooperate or compete are: (1) the individual is 
confronted with ambigous stimuli that can lead to a perceived 
beneficial result (gaining points) or harmful event (losing 
points), (2) he perceives these events as beiny contingent 
upon the response of the other person, and (3) he hierar-
chically perceives the harmful event to be of greater cost 
than the beneficial event. This is to say, if Person 1 
makes a cooperative choice, without knowing whether Person 
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2 will cooperate or compete, he has made a trusting re-
sponse. If not, obviously he has made a distrustful choice 
(Deutsch, 1960a). Deutsch, therefore, feels that the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game is an appropriate experimental para-
digm for studying problems concerned with trust, cooperation, 
and competition. 
Gallo and Mcclintock (1965) report that four types of 
variables have been employed with the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game paradigm. These variables are: manipulation of the 
payoff matrices, strategy of the other player, possibilities 
of communication, and individual characteristics. These 
variables all have impact on the degree of cooperation and 
competition occurring within the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 
In order to arrive at the most appropriate type of Pris-
oner's Dilemma Game for this study, a review of these var-
iables is necessary. 
Manipulation of the Payoff Matrix 
Generally the manipulation of the payoff matrix has 
been done in three ways. They are: (1) the differences 
between x3 and x2 have been altered within the framework of 
the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, (2) at least one, and frequently 
more of the game rules are relaxed, and (3) the symmetry of 
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the game has been altered. Usually, the second type of man-
ipulation has been performed in an attempt to encourage coop-
eration, while use of the third alternative has been to 
investigate unequal power relationships between subjects. 
Both of these manipulations change the basic Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game into different types of mixed-motive games 
that are beyond the scope of this review. The results of 
studies involving mixed-motive games of this type will only 
be included when they are directly salient to the convention-
al Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 
In conjunction with this point, it might be fruitful 
to mention that there is a specific manipulation, that 
while slightly changing the outcome matrix, closely follows 
rules mentioned previously. This manipulation creates what 
is called a Maximizing Difference Game, and is contrasted 
to the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in Figure 3. 
Person 2 Person 2 
Bl B2 Bl B2 
Al +4,+4 -5,+5 Al +4,+4 0,+5 
Person 1 Person 1 
A2 +5,-5 -4,-4 A2 +5, 0 o, 0 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game Maximizing Difference Game 
Figure 3. A Comparison of Payoff Matrices for the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game and the Maximi-
zing Difference Game 
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This has usually been utilized to study the three pos-
sible motives that are hypothesized to be operating in the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game paradigm. These three motives are: 
(1) maximizing joint gain, (2) maximizing own gain, and (3) 
maximizing the difference between one's own score and the 
score of his other. That is, a cooperative choice, A1B1 , 
in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game would indicate a cooperative 
motive (item one). But an A2 or B2 response would be in-
dicative of either item two or item three, maximizing one's 
own gain by minimizing one's own potential losses. In jux-
taposition to this, the Maximizing Difference Game allows 
the experimenter to study the competitive motive in iso-
lation. That is, the competitive choice, A2 or B2 , would be 
representative of motive three, since there is no probabil-
ity of either subject ever obtaining a negative score. 
A review of the literature indicates that there are no 
studies showing specific differences in results obtained from 
using these two types of games. Since the present study is 
concerned with cooperation and competition, the review of 
literature has treated the Maximizing Difference's Game and 
the Prisoner's Dilemma Game as the same type of mixed-motive 
game. 
The two primary factors of influence in the manipula-
tion of payoff matrices have been the increase in the payoff 
differential, which produces more competition, and reward 
value. The higher the reward value, the more cooperation 
it engenders. 
Along these lines, Rapoport and Orwant (1962) have 
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developed an index of competitive advantage. This index is 
obtained by subtracting the x2 payoff from the x3 payoff 
(see Figure 1). Numerous other studies have expanded this 
index, and thereby achieved a greater percentage of competi-
tive interactions (Ells and Sermatt, 1966; Komorita and 
Mechling, 1967; Minas, Scodel, Marlowe and Rawson, 1960). 
Stelle and Tedeschi (1967) achieved similar results using a 
variation of the competitive index. The studies by Minas 
and Scodel (1960) relaxed rule 2 (X3 x1 ) and rule 4 (X4 x2) 
of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game to make competition less 
rewarding. Rule 4 was manipulated to make a competitive 
choice (A2B2 ) the most punitive. Rule 2 was manipulated 
to reduce the individual gain that a competitive choice 
would produce. These manipulations indeed succeeded in 
reducing competitive choices; however, the competitive 
choices still exceeded the cooperative choices. As Scodel 
(1962) pointed out, these studies demonstrate the competi-
tiveness with which the Prisoner's Dilemma Game is normally 
played. 
Attempts have been made at manipulating the mundane 
realism of the payoff that is frequently represented by 
having interactions occur for real and imaginary monies. 
Evans (1964), Gallo, Funk and Levine (1969), and Wrightsman 
(1966) have found that subjects continue to make the same 
percentage of competitive responses irrespective of the 
mundane realism of the conditions. 
There is some evidence that trivial payoffs result in 
more competitive responses. Mcclintock and McNeel (1966) 
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varied high (one cent) versus low (one-tenth of a cent) 
reward and found more competitive responses in the low pay-
off condition. Ells and Sermat (1966) and McClintock and 
McNeel (1964, 1967) found similar results. However, in 
all these studies, the differences between the high payoff 
condition and the low payoff condition are still relatively 
insignificant. In a study by Radlow (1965) in which he 
attempts to overcome this superficiality of reward, the 
reward payoff was increased to six dollars under the lowest 
cell sum (A2 ,B 2). Under these conditions, Radlow notes 
that subjects played more cooperatively. Oskamp and Perlman 
(1965) supported this position when they found that higher 
average payoffs per trial produced more cooperation. 
While manipulation of the matrix was found to have an 
effect on the outcome of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, the 
present study kept the outcome matrix constant throughout 
all trials and subjects to insure that this source of 
variation did not occur. 
Individual Characteristics 
There have been numerous studies that suggest competi-
tive individuals have the following traits: (1) they score 
high on need for agression and autonomy on the Gough 
Adjective Check List, (2) they score high on the F Scale, 
(3) they adhere to more inflexible ethical standards, and 
(4) they are not altruistically orientated. Conversely, 
these same studies have found that cooperative individuals 
had the following traits: (1) they score high on need 
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abasement on the Gough Adjective Check List, (2) they are 
internationalistic, (3) they subscribe to less rigid ethical 
standards, and (4) they are altruistic in orientation. The 
question of sex influences in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
has been addressed by Grant and Sermat (1969). They note 
that females cooperated more than males, and received more 
cooperation than did males. An unpublished study by Vance 
and Helm (1974) showed expectations for greater cooperation 
by females in male-female dyads, supporting this position. 
Deutsch (1960) concluded that high scorers on the F 
Scale play more competitively than do low scorers. Deutsch's 
study employed only two trials, and subjects were told that 
the simulated ''other" player had made a cooperative response 
before each of his choices. He felt that a competitive 
choice for the first trial could be construed to be a lack 
of trust on the part of the subject, while a competitive 
choice on the second trial indicated a lack of trustworthi-
ness on the part of the subject. 
There have been several studies into the effects of 
internationalistic and isolationist foreign policy belief 
on competition and cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game. Generally these studies have found that internation-
alist subjects cooperate more than do the isolationist 
subjects. Lutzker (1960) found that internationalism cor-
related negatively with high scores on the F Scale. He 
further demonstrated that internationalistic subjects made 
fewer competitive responses than did isolationist subjects. 
However, these findings are still in keeping with Scodel's 
(1962) observation that the Prisoner's Dilemma Game is 
normally competitively played; that is, the international-
ists still made competitive choices in the majority of the 
trials. Mcclintock, Harrison, Strand, and Gallo {1963) 
confirmed these findings. In a later study Mcclintock, 
Gallo, and Harrison (1965) posit that internationalists 
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may be more responsive to their partner's strategy, since 
they punished competitive and rewarded cooperative behavior 
with more credibility than did the isolationists. 
Bixenstein, Potash, and Wilson (1963) developed a measure 
of a personality variable called 'flexible ethicality', 
used in an investigation of ethical flexibility effects on 
cooperation and competition. Bixenstein's scale measures 
the extent to which a hero is approved on moderate ethical 
grounds (N) , or on the basis of his adherence to extreme 
and rigid ethics (F) . This scale consists of twenty stor-
ies, each followed by four comments. Subjects were asked 
to read the stories and judge the cornm~nts for agreement 
with their own reaction to the hero's decision. The com-
ments had been drawn from particular classes so that a 
moderate (N) or rigid (F) ethical score could be ascertained. 
Bixenstein found that subjects that scored high on the 
flexibility ethicality index (N-F) made more cooperative 
choices than medium or low scorers. 
The outlook that an individual takes toward his fellow 
man seems to influence the extent to which he will coop-
erate or compete. Marlowe (1963) found that competitive 
subjects scored higher than cooperative subjects on need 
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for agression, and autonomy, while cooperative subjects 
scored higher on need abasement and deference as measured 
by the Heilbrun adaption of the Gough Adjective Check List. 
Along these lines, Marlowe, Gergen, and Doob (1966) noted 
that subjects who anticipated ongoing interaction were more 
exploitative of egotistical partners than self-effacing 
partners. Terhune (1968) examined the relation of achieve-
ment affiliation and power motives, measured by the The-
matic Apperception Test (TAT) . He concluded that trends 
of behavior were suppressed by the inclusion of a threat 
condition which minimized motive differences. That is 
altruistic, trusting subjects made more cooperative re-
sponses than did subjects who held a more negative view of 
human nature, as measured by Wrightsman's Philosophies of 
Human Nature Scale (Wrightsman, 1966) . 
Another type of individual characteristic that seems 
important is that of sex. The relationship between sex 
and cooperation and competition is unclear. Rapoport and 
Chammah (1965) had male-male, female-female, and male-
female dyads interact for a period of 300 trials in the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game. They found that male pairs were 
more cooperative than female pairs. However, when males 
interacted with females, the sex differences tended to 
disappear. Just the opposite was found by Grant and Sermat 
(1969) when they concluded that females were more coop-
erative than males. A number of other studies have found 
males to be more cooperative (Bixenstine, Chamber, and 
Wilson, 1964; Komorita, 1965; and Oskamp and Perlman, 1965). 
These studies are in direct opposition to studies that 
found no sex differences (Bixenstein, Potash, and Wilson, 
1963; Lutzker, Minas, et al., 1960; and Wilson and 
Bixenstein, 1962). 
In summary, the individual sources of variation were 
held to be of salient interest to the present study. The 
variance attributed to sex was held constant by utilizing 
all male merr~ers in this experiment. No attempt was made 
to correlate this study to already existing measures of 
individual personality traits, as Deutsch (1960) has done 
with the F Scale. The present study utilized the attribu-
tion concepts similar to Marlowe (1963) and Gergen and 
Do ob ( 19 6 6) . 
Strategy of the Other 
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There have been numerous attempts to determine strategy 
effects on dyadic interaction. The results of these 
studies, while implicating non-cooperative tendencies, are 
not clear. For example, high unconditional strategies, 
those approaching 100 percent cooperative or competitive 
choices, do not elicit cooperation from the subjects. 
Also, matching or systematically varying the strategies 
increases competition. Several of the experiments referred 
to used a "simulated other", which means that the subjects 
interacted with a preplanned set of responses engineered 
by the experimenter, while hopefully believing they were 
in interaction with a real person. Bixenstine, Potash, and 
Wilson (1963) used unstructured planned strategies of 83 
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percent cooperative responses for one group, and 83 percent 
competitive responses on the second group of subjects. 
These preplanned strategies were continued for 30 trials. 
For the next 60 trials a matching strategy was followed 
where the subjects response was matched by the program. 
They found no differences between the groups or between 
the strategies used on the groups. Mcclintock, et al. 
(1963) used randon strategies of 85, 50 and 15 percent 
cooperative responses, and they found no differences 
between the three groups. Scodel (1962) used 100 percent 
cooperative strategies against one of his groups. Against 
a second group, he employed a strategy of the first ten 
trials being competitive and the remaining cooperative. 
He found no group differences. Gahagen and Tedeschi (1968) 
varied strategies near the 50 percent range and found no 
differences between groups. The same conclusions were 
reached by Komorita (1965), Minas (1960), and Sermat (1964). 
However, there are exceptions to these findings. 
Solomon (1960) used the following strategies: (1) 100 
percent competitive, (2) 100 percent cooperative, and (3) 
a cooperative choice on trial one, followed by matching the 
subject's responses. Solomon's game lasted for six trials. 
He found that the third strategy produced more cooperative 
responses than the other unconditional strategies. Further-
more, post-experimental interviews revealed that subjects 
either thought there was no other person in the uncondition-
al strategies, or that "he'' was rather foolish. Bixenstein 
and Wilson (1963) found that when the systematically varied 
programmed strategy reached 95 percent, that cooperative 
or competitive responses of the subjects matched the pro-
grammed responses. They found that a very effective 
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method of eliciting cooperative responses was to use a 
sequential program progressing from low to high cooperation. 
These strategies, however, failed to produce more than 50 
percent cooperative responses in their subjects. Sermat 
(1967) significantly increased cooperative behavior by 
using a strategy consisting of 30 consecutive cooperative 
or competitive responses followed by a matching strategy 
for the remaining 200 trials. In this study, both groups 
showed significant increases in cooperative responses, 
and in some cases, the cooperative choices exceeded 50 
percent. Sermat (1967) further found that subjects re-
sponded more cooperatively following a change in preplanned 
strategy from competitive to cooperative, or when they 
thought they were playing against a real person, as opposed 
to an absent person or one committed to a preplanned 
strategy. Motivation seems to play an important role in 
understanding why very high unconditional planned strategies 
do not elicit cooperation. This conclusion is supported by 
Bruning and Mettee (1966) who used a somewhat different 
task. Their task was to predict the outcome of a simulated 
horse race. Subjects in the cooperative condition were told 
their scores would be summed, while competitive subjects 
were informed that their scores would be added and compared 
to others. Using this paradigm and manipulating feedback, 
they concluded that persistent winners or losers are less 
motivated than those who perform under conditions where 
the outcome is in doubt. 
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In summary, strategy of the other was not manipulated 
experimentally in the present sgudy, but allowed to operate 
freely within the parameters of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 
It was felt that strategy of the other would be a behavioral 
representation of the status characteristic brought into 
the interaction. Furthermore, attempts to manipulate 
strategy in a controlled manner by having the subject inter-
act with an imaginary other lack the degree of realism 
sought in the present work; therefore, no strategies were 
imputed to either subject. 
Communication Possibilities 
Possibilities for communication, the fourth major 
variable, has had more consistent findings. Generally, 
the more opportunity there is for communication, the more 
cooperation results. Loomis (1959) employed the Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game to study communication effects on cooperative 
and competitive choices. One half of his subjects received 
standardized notes expressing expectation intention, retali-
ation, absolution, or a mixture of these, while the other 
one half sent these messages. He found that subjects who 
sent or received messaged perceived more mutual trust than 
subjects who were unable to communicate; the level of trust 
varying with the complexity of the message allowed. 
That is, the more complete messages engendered higher 
levels of trust. A number of other studies have obtained 
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comparable results (Evans, 1964; Horai and Tedeschi, 1969; 
Radlow and Weidner, 1966; Scodel, et al., 1959; and Terhune, 
1968). Pilisuk and Skolnick (1968) and Tedeschi, Lindskold, 
and Horai and Gahagan (1969) found that a conciliatory 
manner, with honest prior announcement of intentions, led 
to higher degrees of cooperation after subjects had been 
given the motivational set to maximize their own gain. 
Gahagan and Tedeschi (1968) found increased amounts of 
cooperation, if the subject felt he could predict the 
strategy of the other, which was a preplanned matching 
strategy in their case. In summary, the possibility of 
conununication has generally resulted in a more cooperative 
response. In the present study, the opportunity to send 
and receive messages was presented to both subjects 50 
percent of the time. There were five messages available 
to both subjects, and the frequency of their uses was ex-
amined. The five messages chosen were: (1) a directive 
message, chosen because of the status differentials in the 
study, (2) a cooperative statement, chosen because of the 
status differentials in the study, (3) a contingent threat, 
demanding a Choice 1 on the next trial or points would be 
subtracted, (4) a contingent promise, making an influence 
attempt by offering a ten point reward for a Choice 1 on 
the next trial, and (5) a non-message message, communicating 
a desire to not make a disclosure at that time. These 
measures were felt to provide realistic strategy opportuni-
ties for the status interactions in the present study. 
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Other Variables of Importance in the PDG 
In addition to the four major variables mentioned pre-
viously, there are other salient factors that have been less 
thoroughly investigated, and merit acknowledgment. Oskamp 
and Perlman (1965) found that friendships ranging from un-
acquainted to "fairly" friendly had no effect on Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game responses. However, close friendship can 
produce high amounts of either competition or cooperation. 
Unrewarding prior dyadic experience resulted in increased 
competition in a second Prisoner's Dilewma Game in experi-
ments by Marlowe, Gergen and Doob (1966) and Mcclintock 
and McNeel (1967). Along these same lines Harrison and 
McClintock (1965) compared subjects who were rewarded 
during a reaction-time game with subjects who had no 
previous dyadic experience. They report that previously 
rewarded subjects exhibit a higher percentage of coopera-
tive responses. 
In other studies, Rapoport and Dale (1966) reported 
that subjects cooperate more at first and compete more on 
the last trials if they know how many trials there will be. 
They refer to this phenomenon as the "end" and "start" 
effects. Mcclintock and McNeel (1966) and Messick and 
Mcclintock (1968) note that if an opponent's score is fed 
back to the subject during the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, 
more competition results. The latter investigators also 
noted that labeling the other person as opponent or partner 
made no difference in game playing responses. Evans and 
Crumbaugh (1966) found that if the Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
is presented in non-matrix form, more cooperation results. 
Marwell, Ratcliff, and Schmitt (1969) found that subjects 
who found themselves arbitrarily behind at the beginning 
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of play cooperate less often than their ahead partners. 
Additionally, Oskamp and Perlman (1965) reach the following 
conclusions: (1) level of cooperation is sensitive to the 
amount of social interaction at the beginning of the ex-
periment; (2) higher levels of cooperation are more easily 
achieved with subjects from smaller colleges as opposed to 
large universities; (3) previous public commitment to the 
norm that cooperation in the game is desirable, results in 
more cooperation; and (4) instructions labeling the experi-
ment as dealing with cooperation and competition have no 
effect. 
Deutsch (1960) manipulated competition and cooperation 
in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game by varying program instruc-
tions. His different sets of instructions emphasized the 
three possible motives that could be operating in the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game. His instructions called for max-
imizing own gain, maximizing joint gain, and maximizing 
difference between own and other's gain. The sets were 
called individualistic, cooperative, and competitive. He 
obtained the following results: (1) the individualistic 
set group cooperated between 21 and 27 percent of the time; 
(2) the cooperative group set cooperated between 78 and 97 
percent of the time; and (3) the competitive set group 
cooperated between 13 and 36 percent of the time. Since 
the present study was interested only in status effects on 
cooperation and competition, the first set of program in-
structions were utilized. 
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Additionally, the present research was also concerned 
with measuring post-game attitudes of self and opponents. 
Wilson, Chun, and Kayatani (1965) had two teammates jointly 
choose a strategy of play against an opposing team, while 
playing the same Prisoner's Dilemma Game between themselves 
to determine the division of the winnings, if any. Subjects 
were college students and the game lasted 20 trials. Results 
showed that partners received more cooperative choices than 
their opponents. After 20 trials, all subjects were rated 
by each other on personality, sociometric ability, and 
motive traits. Positive ratings on motives such as kind, 
cooperative, and generous increased for partners and de-
creased for opponents. Examples of the personality traits 
used are anxious, dependable, and gullible. Some of the 
sociometric traits were likable, attractive, and desirable 
as a friend. Ability traits were chacterized as capable, 
efficient, and intelligent. Subjects were rated on a nine 
point scale with each of the other three persons on a total 
of 22 traits. 
Zajonc and Marin (1967), using two-man teams in a 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game, investigated the effects of inter-
personal attitudes of winning and losing. One member of 
each team was programmed to reduce the likelihood of his 
team gaining points, while the other team member always 
increased that likelihood. This was accomplished by having 
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one member of the team play one member of the other team, 
while their teammates observed the progression of the game. 
After a fixed number of trials, the observing teammates 
would play one another. The winner of one team always 
played the loser of the other team. The results of this 
study indicated that successful members had more favorable 
attitudes tmvards their opponents than their teammates. 
Pylyshyn, Agnew, and Illingworth (1966) found that two-man 
teams made more cooperative responses than individuals. 
In summary of these studies, it seems that greater 
degrees of cooperation can be obtained by (1) some previous 
acquaintance or social interaction prior to the game, (2) 
giving the subjects a cooperative motivational set, (3) 
allowing interaction within the game in a non-matrix form, 
and (4) playing the Prisoner's Dilemma Game with a partner. 
More competition can be induced by (1) having opponents' 
score available, (2) having close friends play the Prisoner's 
Dilenuna Game, (3) playing the game with an opponent, and (4) 
giving the subjects a competitive motivational set. 
In the present study, subjects who were friends were not 
used, nor were subjects with previous social interaction. 
The motivational set of the instructions were neutral, to 
prevent creating experimenter demands. And lastly, opponent's 
scores were available after completion of 20 trials, and at 
completion of the game, to minimize their competitive effect. 
h summary of cooperative and competitive variables in the 
Prisoner's Diiettuna Game can best be conceptualized in tables. 
The most important competitive and cooperative variables are 
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represented in Tables I and II, respectively. 
'l'ABLE I 
VARIABLES INFLUENCING COMPETITION IN THE 
PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME 
Variable 
( 1) Allow no cornmyinication 
(2) Competitive instruc-
tions 
(3) Large index of com-
petitive advantage 
(4) Less than 100 percent 
consistent strate~v of 
"CJther" 
.~~cw r·ewa.i:·c.s 
(6) No prior acauaintance 
of subjects 
(7) Non-altruistic subjects 
Reference 
(1) Evans, 1964; Horai and 
Tedeschi, 1969; Loorni$, 
1959; Pilisuk and 
Skolnick, 1968; Radlow 
and Weidner, 1966; 
Scodel, 1959; Swenson, 
1967; Tedeschi, et al., 
1969; Terhune, 1968 
(2) Deutsch, 1960a 
(3) Ells and Sermat, 1968; 
:<.omori ta and Mechling, 
1967; Minas, et al., 
1960; Scodel, 1959; 
Scodel, 1962; Steele 
Tedeschi, 1967 
(4) Bi:~e:lst:Lr:.e, et al.,, 1S1 ~<~: 
Gahagen and Tedes.:::h.i. 
1968; Komorita, 1965; 
Mcclintock, et al., 
1963: Minas, et al.~ 
1960 
( 5) E··1jJ.·.1::J r ·\ __ :;\ (~.t.~; G<1-~~lc~ ,-: e·t 
al~, 13S9: McCl~ntock 
and ~cNe?l. 1966~ 
wd .. gr~tsr;'.a;-1; 19 66 
(6) Oskarnp and Perlman, 
1965 
;. 




(8) Present the opponent's 
score 
(9) Previous competitive 
experience 
(10) Subjects from large 
colleges 
(11) Subjects with high 
scores on "F" Scale 
(12) Subjects with isola-
tionistic policy 
beliefs 
(13) Subjects with more 
rigid ethical beliefs 
(14) Use of real opponents 
Reference 
(8) Mcclintock and McNeel, 
1966; Mcclintock and 
McNeel, 1967 
(9) Marlowe, et al., 1966; 
Mcclintock and McNeel, 
1967; Scodel, 1962 
(10) Oskamp and Perlman, 
1965 
(11) Deutsch, 1960 
(12) Leuzker, 1960; 
Mcclintock, et al., 
1963; McClintock, et 
al• I 19 65 
(13) Bixenstine, et al., 
1963; Bixenstine and 
Wilson, 1963 
(14) Wilson, Chun, and 
Kayatani, 1965; Wilson 
and Rickard, 1968 
TABLE II 
VARIABLES INFLUENCING COOPERATION IN THE 
PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME 
Variable 
(l} Allow communication 
Reference 
(1) Evans, 1964; Horai and 
Tedeschi, 1969; Loomis, 
1959; Pilisuk and 
Skolnick, 1968; Radlow 
















Altruistic subjects (2) 
Cooperative instructions (3) 
Matching subject's (4) 
strategy 
Non-matrix form of (5) 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
Previous cooperative (6) 
experience 
Previously acquainted (7) 
subjects 
Subjects from small (8) 
colleges 
Subjects with inter- (9) 
nationalistic foreign 
Subjects with less (10) 
ethical beliefs 
Subjects with low (11) 
scores on "F" Scale 
Use of partners (12) 
Very high outcome (13) 
rewards 
Reference 
Scodel, et al., 1959; 
Swensson, 1967; 
Tedeschi, et al., 
1969; Terhune, 1968 
Wrightsman, 1966 
Deutsch, 1960 
Bixenstine and Wilson, 
1963; Sermat, 1967 
Evans and Crumbaugh, 
1966 
Marlowe, et al., 1966; 
Mcclintock and McNeel, 
1967; Scodel, 1962 
Oskamp and Perlman, 
1965 
Oskamp and Perlman, 
1965 
Lutzker, 1960; 
Mcclintock, et al., 
1963; Mcclintock, et 
al., 1965 
Bixenstine, et al., 
1963; Bixenstine and 
Wilson, 1963 
Deutsch, 1960 
Wilson, Chun, and 
Kayatani, 1965; Wilson 
and Rickard, 1968 
Oskamp and Perlman, 
1965; Radlow, 1965 
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Overview and Hypotheses 
Subjects were differentiated according to high status 
(Company Grade Officers) or low status (ROTC Cadets) . The 
low status person, in general, might be described as a 
person who perceives himself as lacking in power, who lacks 
self confidence, and who has a generalized expectancy that 
interactions with high status persons require him to act in 
specific prescribed manner. Conversely, the high status 
type would exhibit the opposite set of characteristics. 
The assumptions underlying the present research is that 
these status distinctions lead to verifiable differences in 
interpersonal behaviors. 
Subjects in the present study interacted with a status 
peer, or a person of a different status, in the context of 
the mixed-motive Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). One of 
two responses, cooperate (1), or compete (2), is available 
to each of the two players of the standard Prisoner's 
Dilemma situation. If both players make the 1 response, 
both win a moderate number of points; if both make the 2 
response, both lose a moderate number of points. In the 
case of unmatched choices, the competitive player gains his 
greatest amount, while the cooperative player loses the 
greatest amount. The PDG matrix used in the present study 
is shown in Figure 4. If both players select Choice 1, both 
won four points; if both chose Choice 2, both lost four 
points. For unmatched choices, the player choosing 1 lost 
five points, while the player choosing 2 won five points. 
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During conventional PDG play, players make choices without 
communication between them. The present study utilized a 
modified version of the PDG which provided subjects with the 
option to send or receive messages on all trials. The PDG 
provided a conflict situation in which the messages avail-
able would appear to be reasonable. The five prewritten 
messages were a directive, a cooperative statement, a con-
tingent threat, a contingent promise, or a non-communication 
message. In the cases of contingencies, ten points could be 
awarded following compliance to a promise, or subtracted 
following non-compliance to a threat. Message use was not 
controlled in this experiment. It was hypothesized that 
both the frequency and type of message use would be a func-
tion of status in the interaction (see below for formal 
statements of hypotheses). 
Because each subject received an individual treatment 
provided by the other in the dyadic interaction, the part-
icular machine that the individual set at during the inter-
action was conceptualized as a condition. The four levels 
of interaction were both players high, or both players low 
status, or the dissimilar statuses of high-low and low-high. 
Thus, the 2 X 4 factorial arrangement of experimental con-
ditions included position during the interaction, and four 
levels of status interactions. 
Measure of Choice Behaviors 
Competition and cooperation were operationalized as a 
competitive or non-competitive response in the Prisoner's 
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Dilemma Game. Analytic distinction may be drawn between 
accommodative, cooperative, and compliant responses, each of 
which refers to a Choice 1 strategy selection in the message-
modified Prisoner's Dilemma Game. As defined by Schlenker, 
Bonoma, Tedeschi, and Pivnick (1970), accommodativeness refers 
to a cooperative response made by a source, on an influence 
occasion, with the aim of producing mutual rewards for both 
the source and the target. At the other end of the contin-
uum, the source can attempt to exploit the target by using 
influence messages (such as threats or promises) to obtain 
compliance, and then make the 1 2' choice to achieve a com-
petitive advantage. Compliance refers to the 'l' choice by 
the target on the trial following transmission of a message 
demanding a 'l' choice. Defiance or non-compliance refers 
to a '2' choice by the target on these occassions. Thus, an 
accommodative-exploitative dimension for the source, and a 
compliance-non-compliance dimension for the target exists on 
power occassions, while a cooperative-competitive dimension 
is established for both players throughout the social inter-
action. 
Some predictions in the present study were related to 
behavioral considerations, and others were related to im-
pressions data. The first three hypotheses deal with be-
havioral considerations of accommodativeness, compliance, and 
cooperation, within the context of the PDG. Mehrabian (1970) 
observed that low status subjects were more accommodative to 
high status subjects than to subjects of the same status. 
This led to the first hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 1: Low status subjects will be more accommo-
dative to high status subjects than to peer subjects. 
Faley and Tedeschi (1971) observed that low status sub-
jects were more compliant to threats from high status sub-
jects; Montgomery (1971), too, suggested that high status 
subjects were more compliant to peer requests than to re-
quests from lower status subjects. In view of these 
findings, Hypothesis 2 was formulated. 
Hypothesis 2: Low status subjects will be more compli-
ant to high status subjects than to peer subjects. 
The cooperative aspects of the interaction were reviewed 
on the basis of overall game interaction defined by the 
subject making a Choice 1. Oskamp and Perlman (1965) found 
that a previous commitment to cooperate would lead to more 
cooperation during interaction. This cooperative set is 
frequently instilled in low status members under the guise 
of being a 'team' playeri that is, cooperative with high 
status members. On the other hand, Gartner and Iverson 
(1967) observed that the presence of an opportunity for pro-
motion (as in the case of ROTC Cadets, upon receipt of their 
commission) would create cooperative behavior in response to 
high status subjects, and, conversely, competitive behavior 
to other low status subjects. This led to the third hypo-
thesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Low status subjects will be more coop-
erative to high status subjects than to peer subjects. 
Measure of Communication Patterns 
Communication responses were operationalized by the 
subject's choice of the five messages available to him. 
These messages were: 
1. YOU MAKE CHOICE ONE. (a directive) 




3. IF YOU MAKE CHOICE TWO, I WILL SUBTRACT TEN 
POINTS FROM YOUR SCORE. (a contingent threat) 
4. IF YOU MAKE CHOICE ONE, I WILL ADD TEN POINTS 
TO YOUR SCORE. (a contingent promise) 
5. I PREFER TO SEND NO MESSAGE AT THIS TIME. 
(a non-communicative message) 
A frequency count of messages utilized by the players, con-
stituted the pattern of communication within that specific 
interaction. An analysis of variance was then performed on 
treatment conditions. 
The following hypotheses resulted from the expectation 
that subjects' influence attempts are a function of an over-
all strategy orchestrated to the basis three behaviors hypo-
thesized above. The frequency use of the five messages 
available were felt to be a behavioral representation of 
these basic behaviors. The five messages available were a 
directive message, a cooperative statement, a contingent 
threat, a contingent promise, and a non-communication mes-
sage. Mehrabian (1970) found that higher status subjects 
elicited compliance by directing acceptable behavioral 
standards. This method of obtaining compliance is typically 
utilized by the military in dress and grooming standards, 
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as well as numerous other organizational directives that 
insure status hierarchies within the organization. This high 
status tendency to issue directives led to the fourth hypo-
thesis. 
Hypothesis 4: High status subjects will make more in-
fluence attempts of a directive nature than low status 
subjects on all message trial options. 
The status related power differential between the two 
groups implies a deferential approach to high status sub-
jects by low status subjects. Moore (1968) found that 
implicit behaviors were carried with status differentials; 
one of these was cooperation with high status members. 
These implied behavioral responses are power related in the 
aspect of initiation of communication. When high status sub-
jects initiate a communication, it carries power overtones, 
demanding compliance by the low status subject. Conversely, 
when the low status subject initiates communication with the 
high status subject, the communication usually invites coop-
eration. In view of these findings, hypothesis 5 was form-
ulated. 
Hypothesis 5: Low status subjects will use the coop-
erative statement message more frequently when interacting 
with high status members than with peers. 
Kogan, Nathan, Lamm, and Trommsdorff (1972) found that 
high status subjects had a greater degree of behavioral flex-
ibility than did low status subjects. They found that high 
status persons could use a threatening communication with 
little possibility of such behavior eliciting a like response 
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from low status subjects. This finding led to Hypothesis 6. 
Hypothesis 6: High status subjects will make influenc-
ing attempts using a contingent threat message proportionally 
more often than low status subjects overall. 
When low status individuals are denied direct confron-
tations with high status individuals by virtue of possible 
repercussions, it is expected that they will resort to a 
bribe for the requested behavior. Zaenglein (1971) reports 
that this method is frequently used by low status members as 
a technique of ingratiation, and therefore, a social credit. 
Therefore, in order for low status subjects to exert outcome 
influence, they would have to resort to use of the contingent 
promise message. This led to Hypothesis 7. 
Hypothesis 7: Low status members will use the contingent 
promise message more frequently than will high status members. 
The last hypothesis dealt with the non-communication 
message. Toder and Marcia (1973), in their work with females, 
found that a loss of face effect inhibited certain behaviors. 
That is, any response thought to be demeaning to a subject 
was avoided as a concession to a lower status subject. How-
ever, the effects of status inhibition should force the low 
status subject to retreat to the non-communication message 
more frequently than the high status subject, particularly 
when the two are interacting with each other. The continued 
threat of possible real repercussions if the high status 
subject were antagonized should result in a retreat into 
"silence", as implied by the non-communication message. 
This led to Hypothesis 8. 
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Hypothesis 8: Low status subjects will use the non-
cornmunicative message more frequently when interacting with 
high status subjects. 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD AND PROCEDURES 
Experimental Design 
In the 2 X 4 randomized block design, 64 high status 
individuals (Company Grade Officers) and 64 low status 
individuals (ROTC Cadets) were allowed to interact through 
a Prisoner's Dilerruna Game for 40 trials. Each subject was 
allowed to send 20, and receive 20 messages through the 40 
trial interaction; that is, a message was sent on every 
trial, with each subject sending 20 messages, randomly dis-
persed throughout the interaction. There were no experi-
mental strategies imposed by the experimenter. The level 
of status of the interacting subjects were: high-high, low-
low, high-low, and low-high. 
Subjects 
The experimental subjects were 64 ROTC Cadets randomly 
selected from a population of 1,995 and 64 Company Grade 
Officers selected randomly from a population of 459. These 
subjects were attending annual summer camp in Kansas. All 
races were included in no set ratio. Subjects' association 
with psychology ranged from none to a Master of Science in 
psychology. They ranged in age from 19 to 35 years, with a 
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mean of 24.8 years. All the Company Grade Officers had a 
bachelor's degree minimum, and the ROTC Cadets were in their 
third year of college. All subjects had no prior information 
of the experiment. 
Choice Behaviors 
Within the context of the modified Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game, a compliant response by the target of a threat can be 
exploited by the source, or can be used as a basis for pro-
ducing mutual cooperation and attending mutual benefits. 
Within the sample matrix used in this game (see Figure 4} 
successfql exploitation would yield the source five points, 
causing the target to lose five points, but accommodativeness 
by a successful threatner would yield a four point gain for 
both. The target's noncompliance to a contingent threat 
could lead to a successful exploitation of an accommodative 
source. However, the source could then justifiably punish 
the target with the threatened subtraction of points. In 
the case of a bribe the target must choose to either accept 
the bribe, that is to cooperate or attempt to exploit the 
source and forego the possible reward. The source, on the 
other hand, can either reward compliant behavior or refuse 
to, and thereby experience a loss in credibility. Within 
the present experiment, when the target did not comply, 
an option to add or subtract light illuminated for ten 
seconds, during which time the subject had the option of 
subtracting or adding the specified number of points from 
the other's score by turning the telephone dial in the lower 
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right hand corner of his panel. 
Measure of Corrununication Pattern 
A frequency count of the five messages available to 
the players, constituted the pattern of corrununication with-
in a specific interaction. The five messages: directive, 
cooperative statement, contingent threat, contingent promise, 
and non-cormnunicative message, were analyzed independently 
by analysis of various techniques for treatment conditions. 
Measure of Attitude Perception 
A modified Semantic Differential (Snider & Osgood, 1957, 
and Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957), was used to provide a 
measure of social perceptions. The Semantic Differential 
ratings were provided on 12 seven-point adjective scales. 
Three rating dimensions -- evaluative, potency and activity 
-- were derived from surrunations of 12 bipolar-adjective 
scales, four adjective sets in each category. The evalua-
tive dimension was composed of dishonest-honest, harmful-
beneficial, good-bad, and kind-cruel scales. The potency 
dimension was comprised of the sever-lenient, cautious-
rash, weak-strong, and hard-soft scales. Lastly, the act-
ivity dimension was comprised of the active-passive, stable-
changeable, progressive-regressive, and calm-excitable scales. 
The Prisoner's Dilerruna Game (PDG) 
The treatment in the present study consisted of having 
each subject interact with another subject of the same or 
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different status through a Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Further-
more, the experimenter maintained a record of the interaction 
on an Experiment Event Record (see Appendix G, Experiment 
Event Record). The payoff matrices for the game are illus-





Figure 4. Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game Payoff Matrix 
Procedure 
Forty-five minutes prior to the arrival of the subjects, 
experimenters set up the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 
Individuals were selected randomly from their respec-
tive status populations (459 Company Grade Officers and 
1,995 ROTC Cadets) and assigned to interact with a member of 
the same or different status. Subjects were instructed to 
report to a specific building at a specific time for an in-
terview. 
As each participant arrived, the experimenter asked 
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his first name, seated him outside the experiment room, and 
had him complete a survey of demographic information, a 
Semantic Differential on themselves, and one on the average 
of the status type with whom they would be interacting (see 
Appendix F, Pre-Interaction Questionnaires). This average 
rating was paraphrased as: 
Please rate how you feel the average ROTC Cadet 
(Company Grade Office) falls on the following 
scale. 
Upon completion of this task, subjects were then 
brought to their respective positions at the Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game. 
The experimenter randomly assigned same status persons 
to their positions at the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in ABBA 
order. Conversely, dissimilar status persons were balanced 
between machines one and two. 
The game apparatus (see Figure 5, Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game Apparatus) was set up in a room (Room A) that was 8 X 14 
feet (see Appendix E, Experiment Room). The only furniture 
in the room were three 3 X 3 feet tables on which the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game rested, and three chairs. Subjects 
were seated with their backs to one another and the experi-
menters panel. To the right of each apparatus was a tally 
sheet (see Appendix c, Response Tally Sheets) on which 
subjects kept their scores and pencils. The only other 
item in the room was the experimenter's event record (see 
Appendix G, Experiment Event Record). 
Upon arrival at their assigned positions at the Prison-
er's Dilemma Game, the subjects were given a set of instruc-
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tions to read (see Appendix N, Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
Instructions). After the subjects had read the instructions, 
the game was explained by a set of standardized instructions 
(see Appendix A, Experimenter Instructions to Subjects). 
In these instructions, several examples were given to insure 
a full understanding of all lights and the game. 
All games were played for 40 trials, with each subject 
having a message opportunity for one-half of the trials ac-
cording to a random message schedule. Scores were announced 
at the end of 20 and 40 trials respectively. After comple-
tion of the game, subjects were brought to separate rooms 
and asked to complete a Semantic Differential (see Appendix 
D, Modified Semantic Differentials Given to Subjects After 
Interaction) on the other person and to predict how the other 
person would rate them on the same scale. When these forms 
had been completed, a post-experimental questionnaire was 
given to the subjects (see Appendix H, Post-experimental 
Questionnaire). When this task had been completed, subjects 
were brought together, debriefed, and dismissed. 
Apparatus 
The subjects' panel of equipment contained: (a) 
Choice 1 (cooperative choice) and Choice 2 (competitive 
choice) strategy selection levers; (b) a 2 X 2 payoff 
matrix with cells which were separately illuminated to show 
the outcome of each trial; (c) five printed messages, each 
with a separate selection lever for message transmission 
with an accompaning white light illuminating when a partic-
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ular message was selected; (d) five printed messages ac-
companied by blue lights that illuminated indicating which 
message had been sent by the interacting other; {e) a green 
light to indicate the start of each trial; {f) a yellow 
light indicating when communication channels were open to 
send a message {h) red and green lights indicating when 
the threatened reward or punishment could be imposed; {i) a 
red and green light to indicate that such reward or punish-
ment had b.een imposed; and (j) a telephone dial to effect 
a reward or punishment. As determined by the fixed matrix 
(see Figure 4), if both players cooperated each won four 
points; if both competed each lost four points. For un-
matched choices, the cooperator lost five points and the 
competitor gained five points. An illustration of the 
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The effects of the high-low status variable were tested 
in a 2 X 4 analysis of variance. The high and low status 
subjects were compared on cooperation, accowmodativeness, 
compliance, and communication patterns. No differences 
between same status levels were expected. 
All hypotheses were supported. Behavioral data were 
tested by Hypotheses 1 through 3, and Hypotheses 4 through 
8 pertained to message use. Subjects' impressions data 
were correlated with the primary behavioral measures and 
used as supportive information for Hypotheses 1 through 3. 
Outcomes and statistical analyses for all communications 
and behavioral measures are reported below. 
Data 
During the experiment, each response a subject made was 
recorded. Each response contributed to a subjects' score 
on the basis of its frequency. Unless otherwise noted, 
these scores were used in the following data analyses. 
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Primary Behavioral Measures 
Cooperation 
Cooperation was defined in this experiment as the number 
of Choice l's made overall; that is, during all 40 game 
trials. The interaction effects (F=ll.583.df=3/60, p<.001) 
provided support to Hypothesis 3 (see Tables III and IV). 
Low status subjects were found to be more cooperative to 
high status subjects than to their peers (see Table III). 
The levels of cooperation between the two status groups, 
when interacting between similar statuses were very nearly 
identical. However, in interaction with another of a dif-
fering status, marked changes occurred in opposite directions. 
High status subjects became less cooperative when interacting 
with low status subjects, and low status subjects became 
more cooperative. The increased level of cooperation by low 
status players allowed the high status subjects to win the 
game in all but four dissimilar status interactions. These 
results indicated that low status subjects assumed a more 
cooperative role when interacting with high status subjects 
than they normally displayed when interacting with their 
similar status peers. The relative difference within the 
dissimilar status interaction is emphasized in that, as the 
low status subject became more cooperative, the high status 
subjects became less so. It appears that the effects of the 
status roles were enhanced when differing statuses interacted. 
These effects were further evident in the source measure of 
Accommodation and the target measure of Compliance. 
TABLE III 


















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF COOPERATIVE SCORES 
Source SS df MS 
Between Subjects 
A (subject group 22.781 1 22.781 
Subjects within grou:es 1734.062 60 
Total 1756.843 61 
Within Subjects 
B (treatment) 72.812 3 24.270 
AB 1631. 406 3 543.802 
B X Subjects within 
groups 2816.812 60 46.947 








Accommodativeness was defined in this experiment as the 
number of Choice l's made during the interaction when the 
source had a message opportunity. An analysis of variance 
for this variable produced significance for both treatment 
(F=l2.468, df=3/60, p(.001) and interaction effects 
(F=51.437, df=3/60, p<.001; see Tables v and VI). 
TABLE V 


















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF ACCOMMODATIVENESS SCORES 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Subjects 
A (subject group) 0.581 1 0.581 0.076 
Subjects within grou2s 461.531 60 7.692 




Source SS df MS F 
Within Subjects 
B (treatment) 112.210 3 37.403 12.468** 
AB 841.773 3 280.591 51. 437** 
B X Subjects within 
grouES 327.280 60 5.455 
Total 1281. 263 66 
**p(. 001 
High status subjects were found to be more accommoda-
tive among themselves than were low status subjects. 
Furthermore, when low status subjects were in interaction 
with high status subjects, they became much more accommoda-
tive to those subjects, and thereby supported Hypothesis 1. 
This pattern of interaction seems to indicate that low 
status subjects harbor specific behavioral responses when 
interacting with high status subjects. These behaviors are 
in marked contrast to behavior exhibited when low status 
subjects are interacting with peers. High status subjects, 
while becoming somewhat less accommodative during the high-. 
low interaction, do not differ to the extent that low status 
subjects do, with regard to the overall level of accommoda-
tiveness exhibited. It appears that high status subjects 
have learned to become accommodative in their peer inter-
actions, and low status subjects have yet to learn this. 
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However, low status subjects do perceive that when in inter-
action with high status subjects, accommodative behavior is 
expected of them, and they provide it. 
Compliance 
Compliance was defined in this experiment as the number 
of Choice l's made during interaction with another, when 
that other sent a message. Overall, there were noteworthy, 
treatment (F=S.687, df=3/60, p(.05) and interaction, 
(F=27.373, df=3/60, p(.ODl) effects (see Tables VII and 
VIII). These ~esponses supported Hypothesis 2; low status 
subjects were found to be more compliant to high status 
subjects than to peer subjects. It was observed that high 
status subjects were more compliant to one another than were 
low status subjects (see Table VII). Additionally, during 
the dissimilar status interactions, low status subjects 
were consistently more compliant to high status subjects. 
Of particular interest was the fact that low status sub-
jects were more compliant to high status subjects in the 
dissimilar status interaction than in the low status pair-
ing. Conversely, when the high status subjects were inter-
acting with lows, they became less compliant than in a high 
status pairing. 
TABLE VII 


















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF COMPLIANCE SCORES 
Source SS df MS 
Between Subjects 
A (subject group} 4.321 1 4.321 
Subjects within ~rouEs 276.817 60 4.614 
Total 281.138 61 
Within Subjects 
B (treatment} 58.416 3 19.472 
AB 281.172 3 93.724 
B X Subjects within 
groups 205.468 60 3.424 









Use of the Directive Message 
Use of all messages, including the directive message 
was conceptualized as a communication strategy orchestrated 
by the basic status-associated behaviors of cooperation, 
accommodativeness, and compliance. That is, the overall 
pattern of message use represents a complicated pattern 
of status-associated game strategy. In this experiment, 
the five messages were statistically analysed on the basis 
of frequency of use independent of each other. The first 
of these, the directive message, indicated that high status 
subjects may have been more accustomed than low status 
individuals to using messages of this nature. Hypothesis 
4 was supported. High status subjects made influence at-
tempts of a directive nature proportionally more often than 
low status subjects on all message options. The main 
effects of status w=6.783, df=3/60, p<.001) and the inter-
action effects (F=41.121, df=3/60, p<.001) can be reviewed 
in Tables IX and X. High status members used this message 
approximately 30 percent of the time when they interacted 
with similar statused members, while low status members 
resorted to 20 percent usage when interacting with their 
peers. During interaction of dissimilar statuses, this 
changed to high status subjects using this message nearly 
50 percent of the time when communicating with low status 
subjects. Low status subjects used this message only 15 
to 20 pstc~fit when they were interacting with high status 
partners. 
'I'ABLE IX 


















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF DIRECTIVE MESSAGE 
Source SS df MS 
Between Subjects 
A (subject group) 0.195 1 0.195 
Subjects within groups 450.531 60 7.509 
Total 450.726 61 
Within Subjects 
B (treatment) 104.211 3 34.737 
AB 631. 773 3 210.591 
B X Subjects within 
9:rou12s 307.281 60 5.121 








Cooperative Statement Message 
The main effects (F=3.028, df=3/60, p(.05) and the 
interaction effects (F=ll.276, df=3/60, p(.001) indicate 
support for Hypothesis 4 (see Tables XI and XII). Use of 
the cooperative statement message indicated high status 
subjects had previously learned to cooperate with other high 
status subjects, while low status subjects, when they were 
interacting with their peers, had not. During dissimilar 
status interactions, the use of this message increased for 
low status members and decreased for high status members. 
Low status subjects used the cooperative statement message 
more frequently when interacting with high status subjects 
than they did with their peers. The relative usage of this 
message decreased from 31 percent of all message use for 
high status subjects during peer interaction to 14 percent 
when they were interacting with low status subjects. Con-
versely, low status subjects increased their level of usage 
of this message from 20 percent for peers to 34 percent 
when in interaction with high status subjects. Interestingly, 
the level of use of this message for low status subjects 
reached approximately the same level of usage of high status 
subjects when ,they were interacting with their own peers. 
Indicating that the accepted use of this message was known 
to low status members; that is, the low status subjects 
appeared cognizant of high status behavior and attempted to 
emulate that behavior when in interaction with high status 
subjects. This did not take place with high status members, 
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however, they appeared to perceive low status members as per-
sons whom you direct, but not necessarily cooperate with. 
TABLE XI 


















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF COOPERATIVE STATEMENT MESSAGE 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Subjects 
A (subject group) 4.500 1 4.500 0.801 
Subjects within grouEs 336.938 60 5.616 
Total 341.438 61 
Within Subjects 
B (treatment) 67.281 3 22.427 3.028* 
AB 250.563 3 83.521 11.276** 
B X Subjects within 
srrou:es 444.438 60 7.407 




Contingent Threat Message 
An analysis of variance for the contingent threat mes-
sage indicated a marked change in frequency of use by low 
status members. Again the main effects (F=S.414, df=3/60, 
p<.001) point out a difference between status use of this 
message and the interaction effects (F=ll. 829, df=3/60, 
p<.001) indicate the directional changes evidenced by both 
statuses. The use of the contingent threat message among 
status peers shows that high status members use this type 
of message less frequently when dealing with status peers, 
than did low status subjects. However, low status subjects, 
when in interaction with high status subjects, simply did 
not use this message. Tables XIII and XIV illustrate 
these findings. High status subjects increased usage of 
this message when interacting with low status others from 
24 to 27 percent of the time. However, the greatest effect 
was the apparent reluctancy of the low status subjects to 
use such contingent threat message in interaction with high 
status subjects (30 to 40 percent). This indicates a 
status related reluctancy for low status subjects to use 
a contingent threat message to a high status subject. 
Thus, Hypothesis 6 was supported. High status subjects did 
make use of the contingent threat message proportionally 
more often than did low status subjects. 
TABLE XIII 



















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CONTINGENT THREAT MESSAGE 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Subjects 
A (subject group) 12.187 1 12.187 1. 949 
Subjects within grou:es 375.188 60 6.253 
Total 387.275 61 
Within Subjects 
B (treatment) 178.406 3 59.469 5.414** 
AB 389.813 3 129.938 11. 829** 
B X Subjects within 
groups 659.063 60 10.984 
Total 1227.281 66 
**p<.001 
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Contingent Promise Message 
The contingent promise message was used more frequently, 
overall, by low status subjects than the high status subjects 
when in interaction with peers and high status subjects. 
Main effects identified the use of differential (F=l8.929, 
df=3/60, p(.001) and observation of the interaction effect 
confirms the supposition that low status members use this 
message more frequently (F=l8.239, df=3/60, p<.001) (see 
Tables XV and XVI). Therefore, Hypothesis 7 was supported. 
Low status members did use a contingent promise message more 
frequently than did high status members. Overall, high 
status members did not alter frequency of use of this message 
regardless of the other.with whom they were interacting. 
High status members used this message 2 percent of the time. 
On the other hand, low status subjects used this message 18 
percent of the time when in interaction with other subjects 
of the same status, other, and high status subjects. 
TA~LE XV 


















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CONTINGENT PROMISE MESSAGE 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Subjects 
A (subject group) 0.281 1 0.281 0.198 
Subjects within groups 85.438 60 1. 424 
Total 85.719 61 
Within Subjects 
B (treatment) 505.250 3 55.427 18.929** 
AB 166.281 3 54.427 18.239** 
B X Subjects within 
groUES 175.688 60 2.928 
Total 502.250 66 
**p<.001 
Non-message Message 
Main effects (F=9.364, df=3/60, p<.001) pointed out 
the inherent differences between statuses in terms of fre-
quency of usage, while the interaction effects (F=28.341, 
df=3/60, p<.001) points out the dramatic changes when the 
two statuses interact (see Tables XVII and XVIII) • Hypo-
thesis 8 was supported; low status subjects did use the 
non-communication message more frequently when interacting 
with high status subjects. The use of the non-communication 
message was found to be higher for hiah status interactions 
than for low status interactions. That is, high status 
subjects were significantly more uncommunicative to one 
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another than were low status subjects interacting with each 
other. High status subjects sent the non-communication mes-
sage 18 percent of the time when interacting with peers. 
Conversely, low status subjects sent a non-communication 
message to one another 10 percent of the time. However, 
when low status subjects interacted with high status sub-
jects, use of this message increased to 30 percent of the 
time, and high status subjects decreased their non-comrnuni-
cation message usage to 10 percent of the time, indicating 
that low status subjects were using the non-communication 
message as an announcement of dissatisfaction with the dis-
similar status interaction. The change evidenced by the 
high status subjects indicates an attempt to convey desired 
behavior to the low status subjects. 
TABLE XVII 



















l'.,NALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF NON-COMMUNICATION MESSAGE 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Subjects 
A (Subject group) 4.133 1 4.133 0. 89 3 
Subjects within grouEs 277.719 60 4. 6 29 
Total 281.852 61 
Within Subjects 
B (treatment) 83.148 3 27.716 9.364** 
AB 251. 648 3 83.883 28.341** 
B X Subjects within 
groups 177.594 60 
Total 512.391 66 
**p(.001 
Summary of Message Frequency 
A summary of message frequencies by status interaction 
can be viewed in Table XVIV, which presents percentage of 
message use. The effects of the orchestrated strategy is 
illustrated most vividly, when the dissimilar statuses 
interact. Low status subjects resort to the directive, 
cooperative statement and non-communication messages less 
when interacting with each other, than when high status 
subjects are interacting with high status subjects. High 
status subjects, on the other hand, resort to use of the 
contingent threat and non-communication message more when 
interacting with peers, than do low status subjects. 
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However, dramatic changes occur when these two dissimilar 
statuses interact. The low status subjects increase their 
use of the directive, cooperative statement, and non-
communication message when interacting with high status 
subjects. This indicates an internalized role that low 
status persons assume when interacting with high status 
subjects. This assumption of a role is not limited to low 
status subjects, as high status subjects alter their be-
haviors to increase use of the directive and contingent 
threat message when in interaction with low status others. 
TABLE XVIV 
PERCENTAGE OF MESSAGE USE 
Message Sent by "Self" 
Status of Di rec- Cooper a- Con tin- Con tin- Non- Total 
Self and tive tive gent gent Mes-
of Partner Message Statement Threat Promise sage 
high-high 28% 31% 24% 2% 15% 100% 
low-low 22% 22% 31% 19% 6% 100% 
low-high 15% 34% 4% 17% 30% 100% 
high-low 46% 14% 27% 2% 11% 100% 
In general.then, low status subjects, when in inter-
action with high status subjects, assume a role of coopera-
tive behavior, refuse to threaten the high status subject, 
and become more uncommunicative (use of the non-message 
increases). High status subjects, during the same inter-
action, may be generalized as becoming more directive, and 
using a contingent threat more frequently in their ongoing 
interaction with the low status subjects. 
Semantic Differential Ratin<JS 
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Subjects were asked to rate their opponent and them-
selves on 19 Semantic Differentials scales (see Appendix D, 
Modified Semantic Differentials Given to Subjects After 
Interaction), each of which were scored on a seven point 
scale from one to seven points. The Potency, Activity, and 
Evaluative dimensions were scored for other and other's 
view of self. The initial self and general other ratings 
did not indicate any differences between pre and post 
measures, except for magnitude. Therefore, these pre-inter-
action measures were dropped. In the statistical evaluations 
of these three measures, all ratings were significant for 
main effects, interaction effects, or both. Each of these 
Attribution measures was correlated to the cooperativeness, 
accommodation and compliance PDG measures (all correlation 
coefficients were tested for significance at 124df). 
Other's Potency 
The four scales which, when summed, provided a potency 
dimension, were Hard (7)-Soft (l); Cautious (1)-Rash (7); 
Weak (1)-Strong (7); and Severe (7)-Lenient (1). Thereby, 
a score of 4 indicated an extreme lack of potency, and a 
score of 28 indicated another who was seen as extremely 
potent (powerful) • A score of 16 would indicate neutral 
perceptions on this dimension. During dissimilar status 
interaction, high status subjects were attributed more 
potency than were low status subjects. The relative 
change for both status levels indicates 15, a fairly con-
stant measure for this attribution for both status levels. 
Hence, a status role was enacted for both high and low 
status subjects, and they acted according to internalized 
norms. (see Tables XX and XXI) • 
TABLE XX 
MEANS FOR POTENCY OF OTHER 
Status of 




















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR VARIABLE OF POTENCY 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Subjects 
A (subject group) l. 758 1 l. 758 0.187 
Subjects within groups 565.031 60 9.417 
Total 566.789 61 
Within Subjects 
B (treatment) 124.836 3 41. 612 6.361** 
AB 310.710 3 103.570 15.831** 
B X Subjects within 
grou;es 392.531 60 6.542 
Total 828.077 66 
**p<..001 
Main effects of status (F=6.361, df=3/60, p(.001) indicate 
that the other, when viewed by high and low status sub-
jects, was attributed a greater degree of potency as a 
function of status. This effect was magnified when dis-
similar subjects interacted (F=l5.83, df=3/60, p(.001). 
That is, low status others were attributed a somewhat lesser 
degree of potency than was attributed in low status peer 
interaction, while high status subjects were attributed by 
low status others to possess slightly more potency than high 
status subjects attributed to their same status. Potency was 
negatively correlated to the accommodative measure (:i::.=-. 56, 
p .05), the cooperation measure (£=-.59, p(.05), and the 
compliance measure (r=-.51, p<.05). These results indicate 
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that the more powerful the other is seen to be, the less 
cooperative, compliant, and accommodative he has been. This 
measure appears to verify the effects noted by Hypotheses 
1, 2 and 3. 
Other's Activity 
The four scales which, when summed, established an 
activity dimension, were Active (7)-Passive (1); Progressive 
(7)-Regressive (l); Stable (1)-Changeable (7); and Calm (1)-
Excitable (7). Thus, as before, a score of four indicates 
a perception of extreme inactivity, and 28, of extreme 
activity. A neutral score would be 16. This dimension pro-
vided a main effect for treatment (F=3.085, df=3/60, p(.05), 
with interaction effects (F=l2.552, df=3/60, p(.001) in-
dicating that low status subjects attributed a greater 
degree of activity to peer others (see Tables XXII and 
XXIII). The attributional measure of activity remained 
fairly constant for low status subjects, regardless of the 
status of the interacting other. 
TABLE XXII 
MEANS OF ACTIVITY OF OTHER 
Status of 
Machine 1 

















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ACTIVITY OF OTHER 
Source SS df MS 
Between Subjects 
A (subject group) 0.031 1 0.031 
Subjects within grouEs 541.125 60 
Total 541.156 61 
Within Subjects 
B (treatment) 48.375 3 16.125 
AB 196.844 3 65.615 
B X Subjects within 
grOUES 313.625 60 5.227 






Activity correlated negatively to accommodation, compliance, 
and cooperation (E=-.51. p<.05; E=-.48, p<.05; and £=-.53, 
p<.05) respectively. Thus subjects who were in interaction 
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with dissimilar status subjects attributed more activity to 
the other when their status was high, than when it was low. 
Hence, this measure also appears to verify the effects in 
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. 
Other's Evaluation 
The four scales which were summed to provide an evalu-
ative dimension were Bad (1)-Good (7); Dishonest (1)-Honest 
(7); Harmful (1)-Beneficial (7), and Kind (7)-Cruel (1). 
Thus, a four point summation indicated an extremely low 
evaluation and 28 an extremely high evaluation. A 16 point 
summation would indicate neutrality. The evaluative mea-
sure indicated a significant difference between statuses 
when they were interacting with peers (F=ll.438, df=3/60, 
p<.001). High status subjects evaluated others higher than 
did low status subjects. However, in dissimilar status 
interaction, low status subjects were rated by the high 
status subjects as being equal to their high status peers 
(see Tables XXIV and XXV) . 
TABLE XXIV 
MEANS FOR EVALUATIVE OF OTHER 
Status of 
Machine 1 

















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR EVALUATIVE OF OTHER 
Source SS df MS 
Between Subjects 
A (subject group) 4.500 1 4.500 
Subjects within grou12s 474.438 60 7.907 





B ( treatment) 402.938 3 134.313 11. 438** 
AB 67.063 3 22.354 1. 904 
B X Subjects within 
groups 704.563 60 11. 743 
Total 1174.564 66 
**p(.001 
Evaluation correlated positively to cooperation (r=.58, 
p(.05) and negatively to accommodation and compliance 
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(£=-.47, p<.05; r=-.52, p<.05) in support of Hypotheses 1 
and 2. The significant main effects reflect a basic out-
look of cooperation that high status subjects evidenced 
when interacting with their peers. This is confirmed by 
examination of dissimilar status interactions, where relative 
evaluations remained unchanged in the eyes of the high status 
subjects who provided the low status ratings in this measure. 
The salient change from peer to dissimilar interactions on 
this measure is provided by the low status subjects who 
rate high status subjects as being more evaluative than 
. 
their peers. Furthermore, the relative increase of this 
attribute in the high status others is provided solely by 
the low status subjects during the dissimilar status inter-
action. Hypothesis 3 can be interpreted as supported if 
we examine the positive correlation to cooperation from this 
viewpoint, it can be inferred that low status subjects are 
attributed as more cooperative by high status subjects than 
by their peers. To do this, it must be kept in mind that, 
in the case of dissimilar interaction, the other represents 
a status different other, and in this case, the low status 
other is attributed as being cooperative, by the high status 
other. Hence, the positive correllation of activity to 
cooperation. 
Other's View of Self: Potency 
The four scales used to provide this measure are identi-
cal to those used to examine 'other's' potency, described 
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previously. However, these measures are taken from the 
perceptive of predicting how the 'interacting other' would 
rate one's own self. Hence, an other's view of self per-
spective. Main effects (F=7.347, df=3/60, p(.001) indicate 
a basic internalized recognition of potency by status. High 
status subjects apparently knew that they would be perceived 
as more potent, as reflected in the relative difference be-
tween peer, high and low status ratings. When the two 
statuses were in interaction, low status subjects believed 
they would be attributed·a lesser degree of potency than 
when in interaction with their peers. The attributional 
change made by the high status subjects from dissimilar to 
peer interaction, did not vary significantly; however, 
interaction effects were (F=l2.240, df=3/60, p(.001; see 
Tables XXVI and XXVII) . 
TABLE XXVI 
MEANS OF POTENCY, OTHER'S VIEW OF SELF 
Subject 
Machine 1 Machine 2 
Status of high-high 19.5 19.6 
Machine 1 
low-low 17.3 17.4 
& Machine 2 low-high 15.4 19.0 high-low 19.l 15.6 
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TABLE XXVII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR POTENCY, OTHER'S VIEW OF SELF 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Subjects 
A (subject group) 0.281 1 0.281 0.028 
Subjects within groups 605.563 60 10.093 
Total 605.844 61 
Within Subjects 
B (treatment) 121.937 3 
AB 203.156 3 40.646 7.347** 
B X Subjects within 
grou:es 331.938 60 5.532 
Total 657.031 66 
**p<. 001 
Differences between 'view of other' and 'other's view of 
self' were low (no statistical test was made), with the ex-
ception that low status subjects predicted that they would 
be rated as more potent than they actually were. Again 
potency was negatively correlated to cooperation, compliance 
and accommodation (r=-.574, p(.05; £=-.539, p(.05; £=-.541, 
p(.05). Therefore, as in the view of other, measures as-
sociated with Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 were supported. The 
negative correlation indicates that as the relative dif-
ference between statuses increases, the attributional measure 
of potency increases, with cooperation, compliance, and ac-
commodation decreasing. 
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Other's View of Self: Activity 
This measure was derived from the same "Activity" 
scales as the 'other' ratings. As in the measure of other, 
main effects were observed (F=3.421, df=3/60, p(.05) in-
dicating that low status subjects expected to be rated 
lower by their peers than did high status subjects. During 
interaction, the two statuses displayed consistently dif-
fering expectations (F=l6.479, df=3/60, p(.001). Low status 
subjects expected to be rated somewhat less active than they 
were by their peers, and high status subjects had expecta-
tions in the opposite directions, expecting to be rated as 
higher in activity (see Tables XXVIII and XXIX). 
TABLE XXVIII 



















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ACTIVITY, OTHER'S VIEW OF SELF 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Subjects 
A (Subject group) 10.695 1 10.695 1. 266 
Subjects within grou:es 506.719 60 8.445 
Total 517.414 61 
Within Subjects 
B (treatment) 80.148 3 26.716 3.421* 
AB 386.086 3 128.695 16.479** 
B X Subjects within 
9:rOUES 468.594 60 7.809 
Total 934.828 66 
*p (. 0 5 **p(. 001 
Again, activity correlated negatively to accommodation, 
compliance, and cooperation (E_=-.547, p<:.05; ~=-.504, 
p(.05; E_=-.553, p(.05, respectively). Thus, subjects pre-
dicted correctly that they would be attributed as more 
active with greater status, and the negative correlations 
to accommodation, compliance, and cooperation indicate 
support for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. 
Other's View of Self: Evaluation 
This measure was derived from the same "Evaluation" 
scales as "other's" evaluation. As in the 'other's 
evaluation', this view point indicated significance for 
main effects (F=l7.237, df=3/60, p~.001; see Table XXXI). 
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That is, high status subjects expected to be evaluated 
more highly by peers, and low status subjects expected to 
be evaluated somewhat higher by their peers than they were. 
An evaluation of expectations for ratings from peer groups 
thus exists for both status groupings. Results indicate, 
as they did in the other's viewpoint, that expectations 
of low status subjects are increased when they interact 
with high status subjects, and for this interaction, 
expectation of evaluation ratings are nearly equal (low 
status subjects slightly lower). This can be seen in 
Table XXX. 
TABLE XXX 



















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR EVALUATIVE, OTHER'S VIEW OF SELF 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Subjects 
A (subject group) 5.695 1 5.695 0.518 
Subjects within groUES 659.469 60 10.991 
Total 665.164 61 
Within Subjects 
B (treatment) 497.586 3 165.862 17.237** 
AB 67.336 3 22.445 2.333 
B X Subjects within 
g:roUES 577.344 60 9.622 
Total 1142.266 66 
**p<..001 
Again, evaluation correlated positively with cooperation 
(.!:_=.591, p(.05) and negatively with accommodation and com-
pliance (,£=-.485, p~.05; ,£=-.547, p<.05). Therefore, 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were supported, as in the case for view 
of other. Again, the positive correlations may be intrepre-
ted as a result of the 'halo'effect of the interaction of 
high and low status subjects. During the dissimilar 
interaction, low status subjects expected to be evaluated 
somewhat lower than they were by the high status partner. 
Furthermore, high status subjects expected to be evaluated 
somewhat higher than they actually were, during the dis-
similar interaction. This leveling effect is evidenced by 
the proximity of all four interaction means (see Table XXX). 
The positive correlation of evaluation to cooperation can 
be attributed to the 'halo' effect of dissimilar inter-
actions, and the high level of evaluation maintained by 
high status subjects when in interaction with each other. 
Low status subjects evaluate peers lower than high status 
others, and as this measure correlated positively to coop-
eration, Hypothesis 3 receives consistent support. That 
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is, low status subjects were more cooperative to high status 
subjects than to their peers. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Each of the eight hypotheses in the present investi-
gation was confirmed. Generally the position of Faley and 
Tedeschi (1971) was support in that high status subjects 
obtained a greater degree of compliance than did low status 
subjects regardless of the partners status. Low status 
subjects were more compliant to high status partners, and 
the high status subject was more compliant to a high status 
source than when the source was low status. These results 
confirm Tedeschi's (1968) hypothesis that the higher the 
status of the source, the more compliance a target will 
give to threats, holding message utility (credibility X 
punishment magnitude) constant, and once again challenges 
the hierarchial conception of status. Deference is shown 
to an equal if both are high status; however, if both the 
target and the source are low status, deference is not 
shown. A possible explanation lies in the apparent peroga-
tives available to the high status subjects. Status 
usually can be equated with power and the control of 
rewards and punishments. That is, a high status subject 
can give more in interpersonal exchanges, and the company 
grade officers used in this study could expect ongoing 
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interactions with each other for some time following this 
experiment (although none were acquainted within dyads at 
the time of the experiment). Additionally, the high status 
individuals may have been merely showing respect for the 
high status other by compliance to his wishes. Thus, com-
pliance on the basis of respect would yield idiosyncratic 
credits (Hollander, 1967) that could be exchanged for de-
sired rewards at a later date. The low status subjects, 
on the other hand, could not expect much in later exchanges, 
as they had little control over rewards that were relevant 
to the mutual experiences, and therefore, did not exhibit 
the same deferential patterns shown by the high-status-peers 
condition. Thus, although the investment within high-high 
and low-low pairs was equal, and equal gains should be ex-
pected within these pairs, the overall level of cooperation 
was higher within high status than within low status pairs. 
Status did have a differential effect on the subject's 
overall strategy selections. High status subjects coop-
erated less often when playing a low status subject. This 
differential effect of status on strategy choices can be 
interpreted within Homans' (1961) theory of social exchange. 
Homans' principle of distributive justice posits that people 
accept the fact that rewards are distributed unequally, as 
long as each individual gains proportionally to his invest-
ment. Homans suggests that investments refer to any at-
tribute or possession of the individual which is viewed 
positively by the remainder of the group, and could include 
such things as wealth, age, job tenure, etc. Thus, status 
constitutes an investment in the group by the individual 
holding the role position, and thereby accrues credits. 
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That is, high status has been acquired by greater investments 
and, consequently, deserves a higher reward. Company Grade 
Officers have invested more time and effort in attaining 
their position than the ROTC Cadets. Accordingly, high 
status subjects in the present experiment expected that the 
appropriate gains distribution, between themselves and 
their low status opponents, should be based on status invest-
ments; they cooperated less often and exploited the coop-
erative low status subjects, insuring an equitable (not 
equal) share of the available rewards. On the other hand, 
the low status subjects interacting with a high status 
other might have expected to gain less, and would therefore 
accept exploitation. The level of cooperation between 
dissimilar status pairs indicated precisely this pattern of 
exploitation. 
The experimental paradigm employed in this experiment 
allows a subject's role characteristics to be brought into 
the interaction and systematically studied. The strategy of 
role related behavior is reflected in the message use of 
the participants. Generally the frequency of message use 
may be interpreted as an orchestrated response designed to 
obtain a Choice 1 (compliant) response from the target. 
The level of message use was found to vary with status, part-
icularly the contingent messages (threat and promise) and 
the attendant credibility of these two messages. 
In previous studies (Gahagan and Tedeschi, 1968; 
Tedeschi, Lindskold, Horai, and Gahagan, 1969), it was 
found that the perceived potency of a promiser of threat-
ener was inversely related to his credibility. These 
investigators intimated that a powerful source who is 
provided with opportunities to give bribes or administer 
punishments, but then resists the temptation to utilize 
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his power advantage, will be perceived as potent. This 
could not be tested in the present study; there were no 
cases of the high status subjects failing to either reward 
or punish as stated. This finding parallels Faley and 
Tedeschi's (1971) findings for ROTC Cadets. The military 
subjects used in the present experiment, particularly the 
high status subjects, may have internalized the belief that 
those who have power should use it. Consequently, both low 
and high status subjects apparently perceived the use of 
rewards and punishments as indicative of the strength or 
resolve of the high status source. The high status subjects 
never failed to fulfill a promise or threat. The implica-
tion is that the perception process is affected by identifi-
cation with an organization or institution, and the norms 
associated with it. Within an institution, role occupants 
who are involved in the influence process perceive others 
as abiding by norms appropriate to their institution. 
Throughout dissimilar status interaction, potency remained 
high for high status members; in fact, higher than when 
high status subjects were in interaction with each other. 
Exactly the opposite occurred for low status subjects. 
Their potency percentage fell from peer status levels to 
lower dissimilar status interaction levels. It appears 
that low status subjects, when in interaction, feel some-
what potent, perhaps on the basis of pending promotion 
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(ROTC Cadets, Commissioning as 2 LTS., on completion). 
However, when confronted with a real status interaction, 
this relation was reflected in a realization that they were 
not yet equal to their high status others. The high status 
subjects appeared not to be aware of status potency dif-
ferential until placed in interaction with low status sub-
jects. Then they perceived themselves as more potent, 
indicating the role crystalization expected in dissimilar 
status interaction. 
The potency results may be due to characteristics of 
the military population studied. Status studies which 
reported the opposite effects (Gahagan and Tedeschi, 1968; 
Tedeschi, Lindskold, Hoari, and Gahagan, 1969) studied 
college students who had little or no military experience. 
High status members, in the present study, were perceived 
as more active, confirming the Faley and Tedeschi (1971) 
finding that activity is rated proportionally to credibility 
in ROTC Cadets. Also, in the present study, only high 
status subjects were 100 percent credible. Low status sub-
jects were less credible with reward than with punishment, 
particularly when interacting with high status subjects. 
It appears that any failure to enforce a threat or bribe 
resulted in an attribution of lowered activity. Thus, 
high status subjects who were 100 percent credible, were 
attributed as more active than low status subjects who 
were less than 100 percent credible. 
When considering the overall strategies of the status 
differentiated subjects for the contingent threat message, 
it must be remembered that there was relatively little 
difference between status peers in it's use, even though 
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in mixed status interactions, the low status person vir-
tually never used it. This suggests that the as.sumed roles 
are characteristic of the statuses brought into the inter-
action. Interaction differences represent a status re-
lated interaction, within the confines of the conflict 
situation (Prisoner's Dilemma Game). Therefore, the dis-
tinctions in behavioral responses appear to be a result of 
role supportive actions. 
Hoari and Tedeschi (1969) found that neither credibil-
ity, nor punishment, nor even sex had an effect on message 
use. However, in the persent study, status was found to 
profoundly affect frequency of message use, particularly 
the directive message for high status subjects, and the 
non-communication message for low status subjects during 
dissimilar-statuses interaction. Frequency of message use 
was generally found to be related to status and the level 
of interaction. All five message-related hypotheses were 
supported. High status subjects, in interaction with low 
status subjects, resorted to use of the directive message 
nearly 50 percent of the time, when they could communicate 
with low status subjects. Through the use of this message, 
low status subjects were informed of the desired behavior, 
and they usually complied. 
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Conflict theorists have suggested that over a period 
of interaction, the more a threatener's verbal messages 
correspond to his subsequent behavior, the more compliance 
can be expected from the target (Singer, 1962). When the 
high status subjects in this study interacted with peers, 
the level of compliance to non-contingent threats was 
greater than for low status peer interactions. When dis-
similar statuses interacted however, compliance levels 
decreased for high status subjects and increased for low 
status subjects. That is, low status subjects assumed a 
role of compliance, and the high status subjects acted to 
maintain role status differentials in the interaction. 
Kelley (1965) suggests that the use of the threat message 
itself involves a latent, as well as a manifest message. 
The source implies his superiority over the target with 
regard to his abilities and willingness to deliver punish-
ment. In the present study, this seemed to be understood 
by both high and low status subjects, as evidenced by the 
100 percent credibility of the high status subjects, and 
the refusal of low status subjects to resort to a contin-
gent threat message to high status subjects. This be-
havior supports the latent portion of Kelley's theory, and 
also provides tacit support for the point raised by Singer 
(1965). 
The act of target compliance may generally be viewed 
as successful influence by the source. It may be presumed 
that all messages were sent with the intent of obtaining a 
Choice 1 from the target. Gergen and Taylor (1969) noted 
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that low status subjects yielded to the expectations of the 
high status subjects. This does not imply that there are 
no role related behaviors expected of high status subjects. 
Blau (1960) points this out when he states that both high 
and low status members of an organization use differing 
tactics of ingratiation when relating to each other. The 
low status subject will make an attempt to create a good 
impression of himself, or at least appear very positive to 
his superior. On the other hand, the high status subject, 
to make himself liked by his subordinates, may belittle 
himself in certain respects. Blau feels that this belittle-
ment is an attempt by high status members of the organiza-
tion to appear as more approachable to subordinates. Blau's 
statement concerning self-effacement by high status indi-
viduals was not supported. The accommodation level of high 
status subjects in interaction with low status subjects 
showed a significant decrease from high status peer inter-
action. Possibly the formality of the interaction prevented 
this 1 or the status effects may have been so powerful as to 
"wash out" this belittlement effect (i.e., no sense of 
approachability was desired). 
Status effects were observed on message use for all 
five of the messages available to the subjects. Tedeschi 1 
Horai, Lindskold, and Faley (1970) earlier found no such 
variation in the use of messages, although they noted that 
message opportunity costs had a deterring effect on the send-
ing of threat messages (no formal opportunity costs were 
employed in the present study). The use of a cooperative 
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statement strategy by low status members probably represent-
ed an effort to obtain Choice 1 behavior from high status 
opponents in the least offensive manner possible. Converse-
ly, high status members resorted to a directive message, as 
indicated by the proportional use of these message types. 
Peer interaction strategies indicate a tendency for high 
status subjects to refrain from usage of the contingent 
threat, while low status subjects increased their usage of 
this message. This was, in fact, the best source strategy 
for a competing subject to employ with a status peer, as 
the worst that could occur, is that both subjects would lose 
four points, with a possible relative gain of ten points 
if the source made Choice 2 and the target made Choice 1. 
The exploitative choices by low status message sources in-
dicate this is precisely what occurred in low status dyads. 
In short, low status subjects played the game competitively 
among themselves, but cooperatively when in interaction 
with high status others. The exact opposite occurred for 
high status subjects, who were cooperative with each other, 
but competitive with low status others. 
The contingent promise was not used by high status 
subjects with the same frequency as by low status subjects. 
The low status subject's offer of a bribe for desired high 
status target behavior (rather than confronting the high 
status subject with a contingent threat) seems parallel to 
the situation of corruption in a public official (high 
status). As compared to threat of punishment, the use of 
a bribe attempt would only result in a minor loss if not 
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accepted, rather than an alteration in basic outcomes 
{incarceration, destruction, expulsion, etc.); on the other 
hand, bribe acceptance implies a move toward equal status 
consideration. Low status subjects could then operate on 
a basis of idiosyncratic credits {Hollander, 1967) to be 
exchanged for desired rewards at a leter date. 
During dissimilar interactions, low status subjects 
increased their use of the non-message message significantly 
more than when in interaction with their peers. If a high 
• • status subJect could not be bribed, and if threats would 
not work, low status subjects could choose to communicate 
nothing. The only other alternative available to the low 
status subject was the·.simple cooperative statement message. 
In fact, cooperative statement messages were used most 
frequently, contingent promises next (bribe), and the non-
message message least frequently. It appears that the low 
status approach to interaction with high status others was 
an attempt to cooperate first, failing that, an attempt to 
bribe; when that failed, there was no communication at all. 
Such a pattern of behavior would seem to parallel minority 
alienation in the larger society of America today, with the 
exception that violence was not displayed in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma interaction. It can be reasoned that if a low 
status person has been unsuccesful in his cooperation at-
tempts, and is no longer communicating with high status 
others, the only remaining behavioral response is violence 
against the high status other in an effort to obtain recog-
nition or restructuring of the rewards scheme. 
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EXPERIMENTER INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS 
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Subjects were given the following verbal instructions 
by the experimenter: 
Subject one (name), I will now go over the 
lights and procedures that will be used. I will 
announce that one of you will have an apportunity 
to send a message to the other. Notice the yellow 
light that illuminates over the right hand column 
of messages of the person having the opportunity 
to send the message. The person having the op-
portunity to send the message now has ten seconds 
to send one of the five messages. To do so, you 
press forward the small lever to the left on the 
desired message. At this time, subject one (name), 
please press the third message lever forward. 
Notice that a blue light illuminates at both of 
your panels; the left hand column for you, subject 
two (name) , and the right hand column for you, 
subject one (name). This indicates to you, sub-
ject two (name), the message being sent to you by 
subject one (name) . 
Next, the green 11 go 11 light wil 1 come on in 
the lower center portion of both your panels; at 
this time both of you would make your coices. 
Now, both of you please make choice two. Notice 
that the lower left hand corner of the matrix 
illuminates indicating that you both lose four 
points. Record this on your score sheets. 
Now, if you recall, subject two (name), 
subject one (name) had sent you message three, 
and because you have made choice two, he will have 
the opportunity to subtract ten points from your 
score. On the upper right hand side of your panel, 
subject one (name) , please notice that the red 
option light has illuminated. It would be at this 
time that you would have to make a decision 
whether or not you wished to subtract ten points 
from subject two's (name) score. At this time, 
let us assume that you do. To effect such an 
action dial the telephone in the lower left hand 
portion of your panel--any number will suffice. 
Notice the second red light appearing in both your 
panels. Subject two, you would now record the loss 
of ten points by checking the appropriate column 
in the same row of this trial. That constitutes 
one trial. 
Subject two (name) , let us go over the same 
sequence with you sending the message. Notice now 
the yellow light appearing over your right hand 
column. You now have ten seconds to send a message 
to subject one (name). Please send message num-
ber three. Notice the blue light appearing adja-
cent to the message in the right hand column for 
you, subject one (name) . 
Next, the green 11 go 11 light will illuminate in 
the lower center of your panels. At this time both 
of you will make your choices. Now, subject two 
(name), please make choice two; and subject one 
(name), you make your choice one. Notice, subject 
two (name), that the upper left hand portion of the 
matrix illuminates; and subject one (name), your 
lower left hand portion of the matrix illuminates 
indicating that you have lost five points. Subject 
two (name), you have gained five points. Both of 
you please record your scores at this time. Now, 
subject two (name), recall that you have sent mes-
sage three; subject one (name) did not make choice 
two and that would constitute one trial. There 
would be no further action required. For the sake 
of argument, let us assume that subject one (name) 
had made choice two; then additional actions would 
be available to you, subject two (name) . 
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The red option to subtract light will illumi-
nate in the upper right hand portion of your panel 
indicating that you have the opportunity to subtract 
ten points from your score at this time, if you 
desired to do so. At this time, let us assume that 
you do. To effect such an action dial the tele-
phone in the lower left hand portion of your panel 
--any number will suffice. Notice the second red 
light appearing in both your panels. Subject one 
(name) would than record the loss of ten points by 
checking the appropriate column in the same row of 
that trial. 
Now, for both of you, the same procedures 
would follow if the option to add were used, ex-
cept that the lights would be green. ARE THERE ANY 
QUESTIONS? If not, we will proceed through twenty 
trials and then we will stop, sum the scores, and 
announce them to both of you. 
APPENDIX B 
PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME INSTRUCTIONS 
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Upon arrival at their assigned positions at the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game, subjects were given the following 
instructions to read: 
Your goal in this decision-making experiment 
is to get as many points as possible. Your 
points are determined by your interaction with 
the other person in the experiment. The inter-
action centers around the Choice one or Choice 
two selections made by each of you on decision 
trials. You make your selection each time the 
green "go" light comes on by pushing the choice 
one or choice two lever in the bottom center of 
your panel. Notice that you will either gain or 
lose points on each decision trial. The number 
of points that you gain or lose is shown in green 
in the lighted cell of the choice matrix, and 
what the other person gains or loses at the 
same time is shown in red. You must record your 
own point gain or loss for each trial by making 
a check mark in the appropriate column of the 
scoring sheet. 
You should take a moment to read and under-
stand the five messages in the center of your 
panel (both columns are the same). The experi-
menter will announce that one of you must send 
one of these messages to the other. These 
messages alternate between you. After you are 
told you must select a message to send, the light 
above your right-hand column will come on and you 
will have ten seconds in which to signal your 
message choice to the other person. You signal 
your message choice by pushing the small lever 
next to it in the right-hand column; the other 
person sees a blue light next to that message in 
the left-hand column of his panel. After a mes-
sage has been sent, the green "go" light will 
come on and each of you will again make choice 
one or choice two. Depending on the wording of 
the messages and the choices made by individuals, 
the sender of the message may have an opportunity 
to add.or subtract ten points to the other per-
son's score. 
A green (add) or red (subtract) light on the 
top right-hand side of the sender's panel (the 
top left side of the receiver's panel) will in-
dicate this option. Action is taken; that is, 
points are added or subtracted by turning the 
telephone dial on the bottom right-hand side of 
the panel. Remember action is not mandatory, 
the sender of the message must make this deci-
sion on his own. The receiver will know what the 
action taken was, as a light indicating action 
will illuminate adjacent to the already illumi-
nated option lamp on the top left portion of 
his panel. If action is taken the receiver must 
indicate the ten point gain or loss with a check 
mark in the appropriate scoring column on the 
same line as the decision trial preceding the 
action. Scores will be summed and announced to 
participants following each twenty trials. 
VERBAL COMMUNICATION BETWEEN YOU IS NOT 
PERMITTED DURING THE EXPERIMENT. 
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APPENDIX C 
RESPONSE TALLY SHEET 
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Watch the decision matrix, and the other person's 
action lights. Each time the decision matrix lights, your 
score is in the green. Make a check mark ( ) to record the 
appropriate points for that trial. If the other person takes 
action that indicates you are to add or subtract points, then 


























































Scoring Record x4= x4= x5= x5= xlO= xlO= 
+ + + 
TOTAL TRIALS, 21-40 
TOTAL TRIALS, 1-20 
TOTAL SCORE 
APPENDIX D 
MODIFIED SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIALS GIVEN 
TO SUBJECTS AFTER INTERACTION 
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Please check the line that is most appropriate to how 
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Please check the line that is most appropriate to how 
you feel the other person will rate you in this experiment. 
Hard . . . . . . . . . . . . Soft 
~- -- -- -- -- -- --
Cautious . . . . . . . . . . . . Rash -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Friendly . . . . . . . . . . . . -- -- -- -- ~- -- -- Unfriendly 
Bad . . . . . . . . . . . . Good -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Active . . . . . . . . . . . . Passive -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Dishonest . . . . . . . . . . . . Honest -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Progressive . . . . . . . . . . . . -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Regressive 
Pleasant . . . . . . . . . . . . Unpleasant -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Stable . . . . . . . . . . . . Changeable -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Weak . . . . . . . . . . . . Strong -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Calm : : : : : : Excitable -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Harmful . . . . . . . . . . . . Beneficial -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Insincere . . . . . . . . . . . . Sincere -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Kind . . . . . . . . . . . . Cruel -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Competitive . . . . . . . . . . . . -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Cooperative 
Severe . . . . . . . . . . . . Lenient -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Exploitative __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ Accomodative 
Trustworthy . . . . . . . . . . . . -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Untrustworthy 























Years of active conunissioned service 
Source of commission: ROTC OCS DIRECT 
(Circle one) 
Years and months assigned to ROTC Program 






Please check the line that is most appropriate to 
how you feel about yourself. 
Hard . . . . . . . . . . . . Soft 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
Cautious . . . . . . . . . . . . Rash 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
Friendly . . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
Unfriendly 
Bad . . . . . . . . . . . . Good 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
Active : : l ·: : : : Passive 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
Dishonest . . . . . . . . . . . . Honest 
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Progressive . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Regressive 
Pleasant . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Unpleasant 
Stable . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Changeable 
Weak . . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
Strong 
Calm . . . . . . . . . . . . Excitable 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
Harmful . . . . . . . . . . . . Beneficial 
~~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
Insincere . . . . . . . . . . . . Sincere 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
Kind . . . . . . . . . . . . Cruel 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
Competitive . . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
Cooperative 
Severe . . . . . . . . . . . . Lenient 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
Exploitative~~=~~=~~=~~=~~=~~=~~ Accomodative 
Trustworthy . . . . . . . . . . . . 




Please check the line that you feel is most appropriate 
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Exploitative ___ : ___ : ____ : ___ : ____ : ___ :_· ___ Accomodative 
Trustworthy __ : ___ : __ : ___ : __ : ___ : ___ Untrustworthy 
Nonaggressiv_e ___ : ___ : __ : ___ : __ : __ : ___ Aggressive 
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Please check the line that you feel is most appro-

















. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
Exploitative~~=~~=~~=~~=~~=~~=~~ 
Trustworthy . . . . . . . . . . . . 

























































H I z ..-4 
::::> 





1. What do you feel the purpose of this experiment was? 
2. How do you feel you contributed to this purpose? 
3. How realistic did the experiment seem to be? 
4. What, if any, part of the experiment seemed "fake" or 
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